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IN PRAISE OF NONCONFORMITY 
Ira K. Lindsay* 
Exemption of existing structures and land uses from new zoning 
regulations is a long-standing part of zoning practice but is often 
regarded as an unfortunate political concession that entrenches an 
irrational distinction between present uses and future use.  This Article 
provides an unapologetic defense of statutory protection for these 
nonconforming existing uses.  Existing use protection represents a 
principled position that balances the interests of property owners and 
the interests of the public.  Far from being an unsavoury political 
compromise, protection of existing uses is a crucial component of 
modern land use regulation that balances the needs of landowners for 
legal certainty with the public imperative to regulate development.  
Existing use protection is a vital check on the excesses of fiscal zoning 
and an important protection for small businesses. 
The special status of non-conforming uses is grounded both in the 
nature of zoning regulation and in the normative significance of property 
ownership.  Existing use protection mitigates the unfairness inherent in 
comprehensive zoning of subjecting landowners in different zones to 
differing rules.  It discourages disaffected neighbors from bypassing 
common law remedies in favor of regulatory fixes and reaffirms the 
function of zoning regulation as a tool to guide development to avoid 
future land use conflicts rather than a means to change to rules in 
response to ongoing disputes.  Over time, comprehensive land use 
planning has given way to greater use of ad hoc bargaining with 
developers.  In this context, weakening existing use protection would 
give the appearance of going back on a bargain and undermine the 
ability of local governments to bargain effectively.  Property ownership 
provides a sphere of exclusive control in which an owner can develop 
her plans over time without outside interference.  Existing use protection 
 
 * Author’s note. I would like to thank Bob Ellickson for suggesting this topic. For 
comments on this project, I am grateful to Bill Fischel, Bob Ellickson, Andrew Verstein, 
David Plunkett, Alex Sarch, Jules Coleman, Peter Railton, Allan Gibbard, Elizabeth Anderson 
and Scott Hershovitz. The earliest stages of research for this article were conducted while I 
was a law clerk to the late Judge Stephen F. Williams. I hope that he would have liked it. 
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allows the property owner to make land use choices with confidence that 
they will be respected while still permitting local governments to control 
future development.  In the context of onerous zoning regimes, real estate 
markets play a crucial role in allowing landowners to acquire property 
where they can be assured of their legal right to continue the present use 
of land. 
Finally, abolishing existing use protection would have undesirable 
effects on property law in greatly increasing the number of takings and 
due process claims by landowners.  The murky nature of takings and due 
process doctrine combined with the factual complexity of zoning cases 
would create great legal uncertainty without providing sufficient 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When the laws change, policymakers must decide how to treat 
decisions made in reliance on the old rule.  One option is to require 
everyone to comply with the new rule immediately, regardless of 
whether they have relied upon the old one.  Another option is to exempt 
those who have relied upon the old rule from the new rule.1  The question 
of whether choices made under a prior legal regime should be exempted 
from new regulations is especially fraught because either option seems 
to involve a sort of unfairness.  Uniform treatment under the new law 
may seem unfair to those who have relied on the old law.  However, if 
those who have relied on the old rule are exempt from the new rule, 
similarly situated people will be subject to different rules in a way that 
may seem inequitable.   
In zoning law, reliance on the old rule is usually treated as 
exempting a landowner from the new rule.  Structures and uses of land 
that pre-exist a new zoning regulation are generally allowed to persist 
indefinitely, albeit subject to restrictions on alteration or expansion.2  
This rule is codified in the zoning enabling statutes of many states and 
is otherwise recognised in municipal zoning ordinances with few 
exceptions.3  Although protection of existing nonconforming uses has 
been a part of zoning practice in most jurisdictions since its inception, it 
has always enjoyed an uneasy status.  Scholarly commentators often 
express a begrudging attitude toward existing use protection treating it 
as, at best, a necessary concession to the political power of incumbent 
property owners or a pragmatic compromise to avoid legal controversy.4  
 
 1. A compromise is to require all to comply but to compensate those who have relied 
on the old rule. 
 2. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., LAND USE PLANNING AND 
DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 4.31 (3d ed. 2021). 
 3. Id. § 4.31 n.8 (citing N.H. STAT. ANN. § 674:19 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. 40:55D-68 
(1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 215.130 (5) (1999)); Kenneth R. Kupchak et al., Arrow of Time: 
Vested Rights, Zoning Estoppel, and Development Agreements in Hawai’i, 27 U. HAW. L. 
REV. 17, 21 (2004). 
 4. E.g., NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, 6 AMERICAN LAND PLANNING 
LAW § 117 (rev. ed. 2020) (“With all the other problems in the early days of zoning, no one 
was particularly anxious to take on this kind of headache. If a policy were proposed to 
drastically limit such uses, the political difficulties of getting any zoning law passed would 
obviously be vastly increased; and no one knew how the courts would react.”); DANIEL R. 
MANDELKER & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND USE LAW § 5.74 (6th ed., LexisNexis 
Matthew Bender 2020) (“The nonconforming use is a difficult problem in zoning 
administration. The mixed land use pattern that exists in built-up cities means that some uses 
will not conform to newly adopted or amended zoning ordinances. A zoning ordinance cannot 
achieve its goal of separating incompatible uses in this situation unless it requires the 
elimination of nonconforming uses.”); Richard Babcock, What Should and Can be Done with 
Nonconforming Uses, Lecture Before the Institute on Planning, Zoning and Eminent Domain 
at the Southwestern Legal Foundation (Oct. 21-22, 1971), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE 
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Despite the ubiquity of existing use protection,5 the underlying rationale 
for the existing use exemption is rarely explored, let alone systematically 
defended.6   
In the most systematic recent discussion of existing use protection, 
Christopher Serkin has argued that special protection for existing uses is 
not required by constitutional doctrine and is unwise as a matter of 
policy.7  He argues that there is no policy rationale for treating zoning 
regulations that prohibit existing uses categorically differently from 
zoning regulations that rule out options for future uses.8  Serkin also 
contends that existing uses are not entitled to any sort of blanket 
protection undertakings due process doctrine and should be subject to 
the same constitutional analysis as purely prospective uses.9 
This Article will answer Serkin’s challenge to the doctrine of 
existing uses and show that treating past and future land use choices 
asymmetrically is usually justified.  Far from being a blot on otherwise 
orderly zoning regulation, protection of existing uses follows from both 
the original logic of zoning regulation as a planning instrument and the 
more recent model of creating zoning rules through a series of one-off 
agreements with developers.  In the former case, existing use protection 
mitigates the unfairness of subjecting similarly situated landowners to 
starkly different rules.  In the latter case, protecting existing uses by 
statute improves the bargaining position of local governments and 
prevents them from reneging on agreements with developers after 
reliance on the rezoning. 
Under both models of zoning regulation, existing use protection 
vindicates values that are central to the normative function of property 
rights.10  First, the protection of existing uses appropriately reflects the 
difference in the value of continuing ongoing projects and preserving 
options for future projects.  Part of the normative function of property 
 
ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 23, 25-26 (Sw. Legal Found. ed. 1972) 
(discussing early attitudes toward existing uses). 
 5. For example, in Somerville, MA, which has a population of over 80,000, there are 
only twenty-two residential buildings that comply with the city’s zoning code. Daniel Hertz, 
The illegal city of Somerville, CITY OBSERVATORY (June 15, 2016), 
https://cityobservatory.org/the-illegal-city-of-somerville/.  The rest would be illegal to build 
today without a zoning variance and only persists because existing nonconforming uses are 
protected. 
 6. See Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1224 (2009). 
 7. Id. at 1222. 
 8. Id. at 1230. 
 9. See id. at 1281. 
 10. See Jeremy Waldron, Property and Ownership, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Sept. 6, 2004 revised March 21, 2020), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/property/#JustLibeCons. 
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ownership is the ability to develop one’s plans without outside 
interference.  Private property provides individuals with a sphere in 
which they can exercise exclusive control and carry out their plans and 
projects over time.  From this point of view, frustration of an ongoing 
project is a different sort of harm than elimination of a future option.  
Protection of existing uses allows property owners to begin new projects 
with confidence that these projects will not be disrupted by most new 
land use regulations.  Distinguishing between an owner’s interest in 
pursuing ongoing projects and her interest in freedom to choose between 
various options provides a principled reason to prohibit certain future, 
but not existing, uses of land under some circumstances.   
Whereas under the pre-zoning regime, each landowner was given 
broad discretion to do what they want on their property, the post-zoning 
legal regime shifts decisional authority over land use away from property 
owners but leaves the option of securing a right to engage in activities 
by purchasing property on which such activity is legal.11  For example, 
insofar as I may not convert my home into a small restaurant because it 
is zoned exclusively for residential use, my options as a landowner are 
restricted.  But the existence of an active market in real estate allows me 
to sell my home and purchase a building zoned appropriately for a 
restaurant, or, better yet, an existing restaurant.  Existing use protection 
gives property owners security that so long as their land use activities 
comply with regulations in force at the time they begin, they will be 
allowed to continue even if regulations change.12  Property owners, 
therefore, retain much of their prior freedom to choose between 
activities.  The difference is that under zoning regimes, this freedom of 
choice is mediated by real estate markets that allow buyers to select 
properties on which their proposed activities are legally permissible.  
Zoning regulation in the context of a robust real estate market and a 
zoning code that permits every legal activity on at least some land 
preserves property owners’ freedom of choice, albeit with significantly 
higher transaction costs given the expense of buying and selling real 
estate. 
Second, zoning regulations, properly understood, are primarily a 
tool to prevent neighboring property owners from developing 
inconsistent plans rather than to regulate existing conflicts.13  Using 
 
 11. Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines 
as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 691-93 (1973). 
 12. Nonconforming Uses, Structures, and Lots, MRSC, http://mrsc.org/Home/Explore-
Topics/Planning/Development-Regulations/Nonconforming-Uses-Structures-and-Lots-
Regulatio.aspx (last updated Apr. 2, 2021) (discussing Rhod-A-Zalea v. Snohomish, 136 
Wn.2d 1, 7 (1998)). 
 13. WILLIAMS, JR. & TAYLOR, supra note 4, § 17.7. 
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zoning codes to outlaw existing uses undermines the function of property 
rights of dividing spheres of authority.  Property rules codify a norm of 
the following sort: “I respect my neighbor’s decisions with respect to her 
property, and she respects my decisions with respect to mine.”  
Aggressive use of zoning law to countermand an owner’s lawful land 
use choices upsets this equilibrium between neighbors and unsettles the 
allocation of decisional authority that property rules are meant to fix.  
This has several bad effects.  Prohibition of existing land uses has a 
strong tendency to transfer wealth from one property owner to another.14  
By contrast, existing use protection prevents landowners from using 
zoning law to avoid other means of resolving existing land use disputes 
with their neighbors (private bargaining, nuisance law, etc.) that may be 
better suited for situations with current (as opposed to merely potential 
future) land use conflicts.15   
Third, existing use protection reflects appropriate skepticism about 
the value of strict separation of uses for those uses that are not so harmful 
that they can plausibly be considered nuisances.  The ability of local 
governments to prohibit land uses that burden neighbors to such an 
extent that they constitute nuisances means that the most problematic 
uses do not qualify for protection.   
In light of these considerations, it is undesirable to abolish statutory 
protection of nonconforming uses and resolve conflicts between owners 
of nonconformities and zoning authorities at the level of constitutional 
law.  The murky nature of takings and due process jurisprudence 
combined with the factual complexity of zoning cases is likely to 
generate a great deal of legal uncertainty in the absence of statutory 
protection for existing uses.  Resolving hard cases involving existing 
uses through constitutional doctrine also may have a deleterious effect 
on the law as judges feel torn between a desire to protect property owners 
who have made important decisions in reliance on prior zoning law and 
the impulse to take a deferential approach to factually complex policy 
choices made by local governments.  Given common intuitions that 
existing uses have a special status, there is some danger that adjudicating 
such cases under the takings clause might expand protection for 
regulatory takings in ways undesirable for other types of police power 
regulation.   
Part I will provide an overview of the treatment of existing uses in 
zoning law and a brief account of the case against existing use protection.  
Part II will discuss two models of land use regulation: planning and 
 
 14. Ellickson, supra note 11 at 699; see infra Part III.B. 
 15. See generally Ellickson, supra note 11. 
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contract, and will show how protection of existing uses is consistent with 
each model.  Part III explores the value of property ownership and how 
existing use protection plays a vital role in preserving a domain in which 
landowners can rely upon their land use choices being respected in the 
future at the same time as local governments are allowed scope for fairly 
extensive land use regulation.  Part IV considers existing use protection 
in the context of theoretical work on “legal transitions” and shows how 
the literature on the advantages of disadvantages of various approaches 
to legal transitions supports the conclusion that grandfathering is the best 
response to non-conforming uses.  Part V argues that judicial resolution 
of the existing use issues on constitutional grounds is undesirable.  
Courts tend to defer to local governments when faced with due process 
claims about land use cases and thus will not adequately protect owners 
of non-conforming properties.  Takings claims in defense of non-
conforming properties provide greater scope for relief, but subject 
property owners and local governments to a highly uncertain legal 
regime that will, at best, provide occasional and mostly inadequate 
compensation for landowners. 
II. EXISTING USE PROTECTION IN ZONING LAW 
A. Nonconforming Uses and Vested Rights 
A nonconforming use is “a use of land, building or premises that 
lawfully existed prior to the enactment of a zoning ordinance and that is 
maintained after the effective date of such ordinance, even though it does 
not comply with the use restrictions applicable to the area in which it is 
situated.”16  For example, a factory producing cement is an existing use, 
whereas an empty parcel owned by a cement company that intends to 
build a cement factory at some point in the future but has taken no steps 
to do so is not an existing use.  The rule in almost all U.S. jurisdictions 
is that existing uses are exempted from subsequent changes in zoning 
law unless they constitute a nuisance.17  The cement factory, for 
 
 16. PATRICK J. ROHAN & ERIC DAMIAN KELLY, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 
41.01[1] (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2021); see also, e.g., Melody v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals 
of Glastonbury, 264 A.2d 572, 574 (Conn. 1969) (“A nonconforming use is merely an 
‘existing use’ the continuance of which is authorized by the zoning regulations.”). 
 17. See MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 4, § 5.74 (“The courts now hold that a 
municipality may not zone retroactively to terminate a nonconforming use,  some state zoning 
statutes impose this limitation.”); JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.31 (“Even where 
not mandated by state law, zoning ordinances almost universally permit nonconforming uses 
to continue. Where not so allowed, some courts have held retroactive application invalid as 
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety and welfare, or as not authorized by 
enabling acts.”) 
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example, would be permitted to continue operation even if the zoning 
designation of the land on which it stands was changed to residential.  
Such a zoning change, by contrast, would quash any attempt to purchase 
a vacant lot and build a factory on it.  The prevailing view is that courts 
will not uphold zoning laws that require immediate termination of an 
existing use absent some special circumstance such as where the existing 
use constitutes a nuisance.18  For the most part, zoning codes stipulate 
the zoning regulations are to be applied only prospectively so as not to 
inference with existing land uses.  As a result, although zoning law 
aspires to separate conflicting land uses, it functions primarily to prevent 
the future development of such conflicts rather than to mediate already 
existing conflicts. 
Nonconforming uses should not be confused with exemptions from 
an otherwise applicable zoning regulation made after the enactment of 
the regulation, such as variances, special permits and conditional uses.19  
Nonconforming uses, by contrast with all of these, pre-exist the 
regulation that proscribes them.  A property may be nonconforming in 
one of several ways.  It may be a nonconforming lot, have a 
nonconforming structure, host a nonconforming activity, or some 
combination of these.20  Unless otherwise indicated, I will follow 
customary usage by referring to any of these nonconformities as 
nonconforming uses.  This Article will be primarily concerned, however, 
with existing uses in the narrow sense: that which refers to activities 
rather than structures or lots.  However, many of the same arguments 
also apply to non-conforming lots and non-conforming structures 
particularly because the viability of certain activities may depend on the 
permissibility of continued use of a non-conforming lot or structure.  
Existing uses and structures are usually grandfathered into the new 
regulatory regime for at least a significant amortization period and often 
in perpetuity.21 
Although the source of constitutional protection for nonconforming 
uses is somewhat unclear, courts have long suggested that termination 
of existing uses raises special concerns.22  Some decisions suggest that 
 
 18. E.g., MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 4, § 2.04 (“Courts today will not uphold a 
zoning ordinance that immediately terminates an existing, otherwise legal, nonconforming 
use . . . . They continue to uphold ordinances that terminate public nuisances.”). 
 19. ROHAN & KELLY, supra note 16, § 41.01[1]. 
 20. See Ellickson, supra note 11. 
 21. See e.g., Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1232 (2009). 
 22. See, e.g., Bettendorf v. St. Croix Cty., 631 F.3d 421, 432-34 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(Hamilton, J., dissenting) (explaining that Wisconsin law protects owners of non-conforming 
uses whose rights have vested). 
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protection of existing users is required to protect an owner’s due process 
rights.23  Others find the primary source of protection for existing uses 
to be the takings clause.24  Either theory is premised on the notion that 
existing uses are entitled to stronger property rights protections than the 
analogous right to use one’s hitherto undeveloped property for the same 
purpose in the future.  In Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 
for example, the Court explicitly noted that the new historical landmark 
regulation did not interfere with the owner’s longstanding existing use 
of the property and contrasted this with cases in which regulations 
prohibited the present use of a property.25  The Court has refined 
regulatory takings doctrine in a number of respects since Penn Central, 
but the principle that restricting a previously permissible use of property 
may constitute a taking is well settled.26 
In many states, the zoning enabling act provides that zoning codes 
must not be applied to existing uses.27  Even when not required by a 
state’s zoning enabling act, most municipal zoning codes treat 
nonconformities as having a special status.28  A few zoning codes do 
require outright termination of non-conforming uses within a short 
period of time.  However, these are usually limited to “the termination 
of nonconforming uses of open land, of nonconforming signs, of 
nonconforming open storage uses such as junkyards and lumberyards, 
and or other nonconforming uses involving relatively small 
investments.”29  Because existing uses are usually exempted from 
subsequent zoning regulations, legal disputes usually center not on 
 
 23. McMilian v. King Cty., 255 P.3d 739, 749 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (citing State ex 
rel. Miller v. Cain, 40 Wash. 2d 216, 218, 242 P.2d 505 (1952)) (“[T]he purpose underlying 
the continuance of nonconforming uses . . . is to avoid potential constitutional due process 
challenges to zoning legislation arising from deprivations of property rights . . . .”); Nettleton 
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh, 828 A.2d 1033, 1036 (Pa. 2003) (“This 
Court has said that the protection evolved as a conceived element of due process.”) (citing 
Molnar v. George B. Henne & Co., 105 A.2d 325, 329-30 (Pa. 1954)). 
 24. Mo. Rock, Inc. v. Winholtz, 614 S.W.2d 734, 739 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (citing State 
ex rel. Nealy v. Cole, 442 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (“Zoning ordinances must 
permit continuation of non-conforming uses in existence at the time of enactment to avoid 
violation of constitutional provisions preventing the taking of private property without 
compensation.”). 
 25. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978) (“Its 
designation as a landmark not only permits but contemplates that appellants may continue to 
use the property precisely as it has been used for the past 65 years: as a railroad terminal 
containing office space and concessions. So the law does not interfere with what must be 
regarded as Penn Central’s primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel.”). 
 26. Bettendorf, 631 F.3d at 433-34 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
 27. See JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.31 n.8 (citing N.H. Stat. Ann. § 674:19 
(1983); N.J. Stat. Ann. 40:55D-68 (1985); Or. Rev. Stat. § 215.130 (5) (1999)). 
 28. See Kupchak et al., supra note 3, at 21. 
 29. WILLIAMS, JR. & TAYLOR, supra note 4, § 124.8. 
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whether non-conforming uses may be prohibited under new zoning 
regulations, but rather over whether a use was legal prior to the 
enactment of the regulation,30 whether such uses can be eliminated after 
a period of amortization,31 whether the use was abandoned by the 
owner,32 whether a change from one nonconforming use to another is 
permissible,33 whether a change made by an owner is a permissible 
continuation of an existing use or an impermissible expansion of that 
use,34 whether a new use is a permissible accessory to a legally 
permissible nonconforming use or a new principal use forbidden by 
zoning regulations,35 whether an owner may transfer the right to continue 
to non-conforming use to a subsequent owner,36 or whether a non-
conforming structure may be rebuilt after a fire or similar incident.37 
 
 30. See, e.g., Eggert v. Bd. of Appeals of the City of Chicago, 195 N.E.2d 164 (Ill. 1964) 
(considering whether the seven-apartment building was in violation of the zoning ordinance); 
Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Leisz, 702 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. 1998) (centering on zoning ordinance 
that limited the number of unrelated adults that could live together to three); Balough v. 
Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 995 P.2d 245 (Alaska 2000) (involving a junkyard owner seeking 
nonconforming use status following a rezoning); Relihan v. Woodbridge Zoning Bd. of 
Appeals, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 545 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2010) (involving a landscaping 
business on property that was later re-zoned and prohibited); Rollison v. City of Key W., 875 
So. 2d 659 (Fla. App. 2004) (involving property that was lawfully used as a short-term rental 
before the city changed the zoning laws); Gavlak v. Town of Somers, 267 F. Supp. 2d 214 (D. 
Conn. 2003) (involving a dispute over whether the operation of a water business was within 
the zoning regulations); First Pioneer Trading Co. v. Pierce Cty., 191 P.3d 928 (Wash. App. 
2008) (considering whether a steel fabrication business could establish a legal nonconforming 
use of the property). 
 31. Art Neon Co. v. City & Cty. of Denver, 488 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1973); Cioppa v. 
Apostol, 755 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). 
 32. See, e.g., Dorman v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 51 A.2d 658 (Md. 1947); Vill. 
of Plainfield v. Am. Cedar Designs, Inc., 775 N.E. 2d 1002 (Ill. App. 2000); Pike Indus., Inc. 
v. Woodward, 999 A.2d 257 (N.H. 2010); Heichel v. Springfield Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 
830 A.2d 1081 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003). 
 33. See, e.g., Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. McCalley, 300 S.E.2d 790 (Va. 1983). 
 34. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dierberg v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 869 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1994); San Remo Hotel v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87 (Cal. 2002) 
(holding that conversion of building from mix of long-term residential and tourist short-term 
rental to entirely short-term tourist rentals was a change or expansion of existing use that 
required owner to secure a conditional use permit); Nettleton v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of 
City of Pittsburgh, 828 A.2d 1033 (Pa. 2003) (permitting expansion of a non-conforming 
structure from one story to three stories on the grounds that the nonconforming commercial 
use would remain the same); Munroe v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Branford, 818 A.2d 72 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (holding that addition on second story on non-conforming garage was 
impermissible expansion of nonconformity); Cleveland MHC, LLC v. City of Richland, 163 
So. 3d 284 (Miss. 2015) (holding that existing nonconforming use status applies to a mobile 
home park as a whole and that replacement of one mobile home with another on a lot in the 
park is a continuation of this non-conforming use and does not terminate it). 
 35. See, e.g., City of Okoboji v. Okoboji Barz, Inc., 746 N.W.2d 56 (Iowa 2008) (holding 
that a restaurant owner was not barred from selling alcohol by the zoning ordinance). 
 36. See, e.g., Vill. of Valatie v. Smith, 632 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 1994). 
 37. Buss v. Johnson, 624 N.W.2d 781 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Goyonaga v. Bd. of Zoning 
Appeals, 657 S.E.2d 153 (Va. 2008) (holding that demolition of nonconforming structure due 
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Nonconforming use privileges generally run with the land.  Owners 
are typically permitted to transfer ownership of their property without 
losing the right to continue a nonconforming use.38  Unless subject to 
amortization, nonconforming uses usually may be continued 
indefinitely, but not expanded or changed substantially in character.39  
Governments may impose various limitations on nonconformities, 
including limitations on changes in use, enlargement, alteration of 
structures, and repairs and replacement of structures.40  Some zoning 
codes allow property owners to shift from one nonconforming use to 
another, provided the second is less burdensome than the first.41  Owners 
of non-conforming properties are typically permitted to make ordinary 
repairs need to keep the property in a condition similar to that it was in 
when it became nonconforming.42  However, it is usually permissible for 
a local government to terminate the right to continue a non-conforming 
use if the property is destroyed by fire or natural disaster.43   
The scope of protection of existing uses is generally determined by 
the nature of the activity.  Thus, expansion of a nonconforming 
convenience store to occupy a greater proportion of the owner’s lot may 
be prevented without injury to the owner’s rights, a non-conforming 
surface mine may be permitted to expand across the owner’s lot under 
the “diminishing asset doctrine, which permits expansion of non-
conforming extractive activities to new portions of the same property 
owned by the owner at the time of the enactment of the regulation.”44  
The activity of operating a convenience store does not require expansion 
to new territory, whereas exploiting exhaustible resources requires, by 
its very nature, the use of new land.45  The scope of existing use 
 
to unforeseen difficulties in construction of addition terminates nonconforming use privileges 
such that City may forbid construction of new home with same footprint as demolished home). 
 38. See, e.g., Town of Lyons v. Bashor, 867 P.2d 159 (Colo. App. 1993) (nonconforming 
use runs with the land); Budget Inn of Daphne, Inc. v. City of Daphne, 789 So. 2d 154 (Ala. 
2000) (holding that statute, which terminates nonconforming use protection of sign upon 
transfer of ownership, is unconstitutional taking without compensation). Cf. Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (holding that a transferee who acquired title to a property 
after the enactment of the regulation in question may bring a takings claim). 
 39. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dauphin Stor-All, Inc. v. City of Mobile, 503 So. 2d 1224 (Ala. 
1987) (holding that because the business of an automobile-parts wholesaler was not 
substantially the same kind of business as a bakery, the tenant’s loss of “legal-nonconforming” 
status was appropriate, regardless of the relative intensity of the use of the property). 
 40. ROHAN & KELLY, supra note 16, § 41.03[1]. 
 41. Id. § 41.03[2][b]. 
 42. See id. § 41.03[3][a]. 
 43. See, e.g., Baird v. Bradley, 240 P.2d 1016, 1017 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952). 
 44. See Hansen Bros. Enters., Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 907 P.2d 1324, 1328 (Cal. 
1996). 
 45. Pennsylvania, however, permits the expansion of nonconforming stores and the like 
under the theory that nonconforming uses have a right to “natural expansion.” See WILLIAMS, 
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protection, therefore, extends beyond protection of physical structures 
but to particular sorts of economic activity—in some cases even when 
the activity requires expansion that may be more burdensome to 
neighbors. 
Although flat prohibition of existing uses is rare, some local 
governments require that certain nonconforming uses be discontinued 
after an “amortization” period that allows a property owner to recoup 
their investment in the property.  Amortization is permissible in most 
states but forbidden in others.46  Amortization is intended to enable 
regulations that otherwise would qualify as takings by permitting owners 
to realize much of their “investment backed expectations” and give them 
fair warning that future investments in their nonconforming use will not 
be legally protected.47  The permissible length of amortization period is 
the crux of much litigation.48  The general rule is that the greater the 
investment in the nonconforming use, the longer the amortization period 
required.49  A few states prohibit amortization schemes altogether either 
by statute50 or as a matter of state constitutional law.51   
A long-standing exception to the principle that zoning regulations 
ought to respect existing uses is that local governments retain the right 
to terminate nonconforming nuisances without compensation.52  The 
 
JR. & TAYLOR, supra note 4, § 121.11. This leads Pennsylvania courts to sanction changes of 
nonconforming uses that might be prohibited in other states. E.g., Nettleton v. Zoning Bd. of 
Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh, 828 A.2d 1033, 1033 (Pa. 2003) (allowing expansion of 
building housing nonconforming commercial use from one story to three stories); see Smalley 
v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 834 A.2d 535, 544 (Pa. 2003) (holding that town failed to present 
evidence that expansion of plaintiff’s tax accounting practice operated out of his home was 
anything other than “natural expansion” of his business). 
 46. WILLIAMS, JR. & TAYLOR, supra note 4, § 124 (rev. ed. 2020); Osborne M. Reynolds 
Jr., The Reasonableness of Amortization Periods for Nonconforming Uses—Balancing the 
Private Interest and the Public Welfare, 34 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 99, 107 (1988); 
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 199-200 (3d. ed. 2005). 
 47. Serkin, supra note 6, at 1236, 1250. 
 48. See, e.g., Cioppa v. Apostol, 755 N.Y.S.2d 458, 458 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) 
(remanding case involving nonconforming tavern found to be a public nuisance so that owner 
could provide evidence concerning reasonableness of thirty day amortization period). 
 49. See, e.g., Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 540 N.E.2d 215, 224 (N.Y. 1989). 
 50. MINN. STAT. § 394.21 subd. 1a (2011); COLO. REV. STAT. 38-1-101(3)(a) (2006); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2307 (2017); WIS. STAT. § 59.69(10)(e)(2) (2020). 
 51. E.g., PA Nw. Distrib., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 584 A.2d 1372 (Pa. 1991); Lamar 
Advert. of S. Ga., Inc. v. City of Albany, 389 S.E.2d 216 (Ga. 1990); Hoffmann v. Kinealy, 
389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1965); see ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 46, at 200-01. 
 52. Brown v. Grant, 2 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (“No one gainsays that a 
municipal government within its police power has the right to prescribe rules regulating the 
character of buildings to be erected and the material to be used within certain prescribed 
boundaries, and also requiring permits to be first obtained before entering on their 
construction. But such ordinances must be and [sic] relate to the future. Of course, that does 
not prevent cities from moving to abate nuisances whenever occurring.”); Jones v. City of Los 
Angeles, 295 P. 14, 17 (Cal. 1930); Comment, Retroactive Zoning Ordinances, 39 YALE L.J. 
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underlying notion is that since there is no right under common law to 
create or operate a nuisance, a local government may use zoning law to 
accomplish what could be legally done by other means.53  In practice, 
this means that uses that pose a threat to the health, safety, or peace of 
the community are not necessarily protected from subsequent zoning 
regulation, whereas zoning regulation enacted for aesthetic or more 
inchoate economic purposes cannot be used to eliminate existing uses.54  
Nonconforming uses are likewise vulnerable to ordinary (i.e., non-
zoning) police power regulation.  A local government may enact 
regulations that have the effect of making an existing use impossible or 
impractical if such regulations are reasonably related to the health, 
 
735, 739 (1930) (“A restriction imposed to prohibit an offensive use is not a taking of property 
for which compensation must be made and in the abatement of nuisances retroactive measures 
are valid.”); J. P. Chamberlain & Sterling Pierson, Current Legislation: Zoning Laws and 
Ordinances, 10 A.B.A. J. 185, 185 (1924) (“Zoning looks to the future, not the past, and it is 
customary to allow buildings and businesses already in the district to remain, although of a 
class which cannot be established. If such a business constitutes a nuisance it can still be 
removed under the police power, but the zoning acts in themselves do not customarily 
interfere with existing conditions.”). 
 53. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029-30 (1992) (noting that the status 
of a prohibited activity as a common law nuisance is a defense against regulatory takings 
claims). 
 54. E.g., Conrad v. City of Beebe, 388 S.W.3d 465, 469 (Ark. Ct. App. 2012) (holding 
that keeping of non-domestic animals and non-operating vehicles did not qualify as a 
nonconforming use because the regulation prohibiting it was enacted in response to “an 
imminent threat to the public peace, health, safety, and welfare.”); City of Fayetteville v. S. 
& H. Inc., 547 S.W.2d 94, 98 (1977) (“When our prior decisions are considered in connection 
with the City’s finding that the existence of signs throughout the City were detrimental to its 
scenic resources and therefore to its economic base, we must conclude that the seven year 
provisions of the ordinance amortizing non-conforming onsite signs used in connection with 
a going business, that are not inimical to the health, safety or morals of the City, amounts to a 
taking of the appellees’ properties without just compensation therefor in violation of Art. 2 § 
22, supra. However, the prohibition against flashing or blinking signs falls within that area of 
police regulation that is exercised for the protection of the health and morals of the people.”); 
Williams v. Dep’t of Bldg. Dev. Servs., 192 S.W.3d 545, 546 (Mo. App. S.D. 2006) 
(permitting termination of non-conforming salvage yard on grounds that it is a nuisance); 
David M. Roberts, Zoning—Abatement of Prior Nonconforming Uses: Nuisance Regulations 
and Amortization Provisions, 31 MO. L. REV. 280, 289 (1966) (“Most courts probably are not 
willing to attach the nuisance label to a nonconforming use unless its deleterious effects are 
fairly clear and substantial. Nuisance has always been associated with uses which cause 
relatively concrete harm to the enjoyment of surrounding property. In the cases applying an 
expanded concept of nuisance the damage which the offending uses threatened was much 
more serious than most zoning regulations are intended to cure.”); Dix W. Noel, Retroactive 
Zoning and Nuisances, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 473 (1941) (“If only an aesthetic annoyance 
is involved, a retroactive prohibition is unlikely to be sustained, although in an extreme case, 
such as that of a large gas container or mausoleum in a residential area, mere unsightliness 
might be found sufficiently detrimental to warrant removal. If harm of a more tangible 
character is involved, such as that caused by noise, odor, soot or smoke, the likelihood that 
retroactive restrictions will be sustained is much greater . . . .”). 
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safety, and welfare of the community55 as long as such regulations do 
not preclude any valuable use of the property56 or constitute a physical 
invasion of the property.57  In many cases, therefore, a nonconforming 
use is protected from a local government’s zoning regulations, but may 
be eliminated by the enactment of some other regulation by the same 
governmental entity.58  A crucial difference between these forms of 
regulation is that zoning regulations are, by design, non-uniform across 
different zones and may cover only a few properties, whereas other 
police power regulations are applicable to the jurisdiction as a whole. 
Because of the significant value of existing use protection, many 
nonconforming use cases turn on whether a property owner has obtained 
a “vested right” to a particular use prior to the enactment of a new 
regulation.  In order to obtain a vested right in an existing use, a property 
owner must do more than form a mere plan or bare expectation, but 
usually something far less than actual commencement of the use 
ultimately contemplated suffices for vesting.59  A typical fact pattern 
involves a developer who has acquired land and made some investment 
toward developing it for a particular purpose that was legal when the 
investment was made.  Whether the developer acquires a vested right to 
continue to develop in the face of subsequent zoning regulations depends 
on the precise extent of the developer’s progress.  Courts must balance 
the significant investments that have typically been made before 
construction begins with concern that granting vested rights at too early 
a stage encourages developers to rush projects to pre-empt public 
scrutiny.60 
 
 55. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962) (“Concededly the 
ordinance completely prohibits a beneficial use to which the property has previously been 
devoted. However, such a characterization does not tell us whether or not the ordinance is 
unconstitutional. It is an oft-repeated truism that every regulation necessarily speaks as a 
prohibition. If this ordinance is otherwise a valid exercise of the town’s police powers, the 
fact that it deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not render it 
unconstitutional.”). 
 56. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1003-04 (1992). 
 57. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 419 (1982). 
 58. See Rhod-A-Zalea & 35th, Inc. v. Snohomish Cty., 959 P.2d 1024, 1024 (Wash. 
1998) (holding that although a peat mine was protected under zoning laws as an existing 
nonconforming use, the County could require the mine owner to obtain a “grading permit” in 
order to continue operations); see Star Nw. Inc. v. City of Kenmore, 280 Fed. Appx. 654, 654 
(9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the City of Kenmore’s prohibition of card rooms applied to card 
rooms operating at the time of the enactment of the ordinance despite statutory protection for 
existing uses in Kenmore’s zoning code). 
 59. See WILLIAMS, JR. & TAYLOR, supra note 4, § 119:2. 
 60. MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 4, § 6.11 (“The law of vested rights and estoppel 
must strike a fine balance between the competing interests of the developer and the 
municipality. A developer needs some protection from changes in land use requirements that 
prevent it from completing the project or that make completion more expensive. 
 
2021] IN PRAISE OF NONCONFORMITY 759 
B. The Anomaly of Existing Use Protection 
Protection of nonconforming uses appears well entrenched and, 
with the exception of various amortization schemes, has been little 
threatened over the past half-century.  Although nonconforming use 
protection is a fundamental aspect of American land use law, its 
justification is not obvious.  In this section, I will explore the case against 
existing use protection.  Criticism of the prevalence of nonconforming 
uses is not a new phenomenon.61  Early advocates of zoning often 
favored the application of zoning codes to both existing as well as new 
uses and structures.62  Although some early zoning codes did not 
grandfather existing uses, existing use protection was already customary 
by the mid-1920’s.63  Juergensmeyer and Roberts suggest four reasons 
for this change.  First, zoning was regarded as a tool to influence future 
development rather than regulate prior development.64  Second, it does 
not seem that the presence of “a few nonconforming uses [are] totally 
contrary to the public health, safety and welfare.”65  Third, 
grandfathering existing uses reduced political opposition to zoning 
regulations by exempting the parties most likely to lobby against the new 
regulation.66  Fourth, although courts sometimes showed a willingness 
to permit the termination of existing uses,67 grandfathering existing uses 
removed a significant legal vulnerability.68  In some instances, courts 
explicitly refused to enforce zoning provisions that did not grandfather 
existing uses.69  William Fischel points to a fifth factor, namely that 
popular sentiment often ran in favor of owners of properties that did not 
conform to new zoning codes and against local governments that 
targeted existing uses.70  This, he claims, tipped the balance in favor of 
 
Municipalities need the freedom to revise their land use requirements to meet new land use 
problems or to implement new land use policies.”) 
 61. Complaints about the persistence of non-conforming uses are almost as old as 
American zoning law. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, ZONING RULES! 186 (2015). 
 62. See id. 
 63. See Chamberlain & Pierson, supra note 52, at 185 (“Zoning looks to the future, not 
the past, and it is customary to allow buildings and businesses already in the district to remain, 
although of a class which cannot be established. If such a business constitutes a nuisance it 
can still be removed under the police power, but the zoning acts in themselves do not 
customarily interfere with existing conditions.”). 
 64. JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.31. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastin, 239 U.S. 394, 414 (1915). 
 68. JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 2, at § 4.31. 
 69. E.g., W. Theological Seminary v. City of Evanston, 156 N.E. 778, 784-85 (Ill. 1927) 
(holding that zoning regulations may not be applied to existing uses); see JUERGENSMEYER 
ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.31. 
 70. See FISCHEL, supra note 61, at 192. 
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existing uses despite skepticism from planning experts and acquiescence 
by many courts.71 
Zoning experts, however, continue to be ambivalent about non-
conformities.72  A leading scholar of land use law noted in the 1950’s 
that the tenacity of nonconforming uses despite expectations that they 
would fade away over time has been “one of the great disappointments 
of the zoning movement.”73  Christopher Serkin is only the latest of 
many commentators to propose more vigorous measures against non-
conformities.74  In addition to more aggressive use of amortization 
provisions, Serkin countenances immediate termination as well.75 
The most fundamental objection to existing use protection is 
straightforward: it seems to impose a sharp and arbitrary distinction 
between the rights of similarly situated owners.  This seems problematic 
for four reasons.  First, existing use protection may appear to benefit 
owners of non-conforming properties unfairly at the expense of 
neighbors who are burdened not only by the persistence of the non-
conforming use, but also by the restrictions imposed by the new zoning 
code.76  Protection of non-conformities entrenches current uses even as 
it prohibits precisely analogous future uses.77  If Al owns a 
nonconforming property, a junkyard, for example, he may perpetuate 
this nonconforming use indefinitely regardless of the burden on his 
neighbors.  His neighbor Ben, however, may not operate a junkyard 
regardless of the relative value of junkyards on Al’s and Ben’s properties 
and the relative burdens on their neighbors.  Ben may not operate a 
junkyard even if his land is next to Al’s and Al’s junkyard compromises 
 
 71. Id. (“This seems to be a case in which the leaders of zoning called for a practice that 
the public was unwilling to accept, even though the courts either endorsed the practice or 
tolerated it.”). 
 72. E.g., Babcock, supra note 4, at 25 (“The landowner’s expectation that he will be able 
to build a factory on his vacant land is not fundamentally different from his expectation that 
he can continue to operate his existing factory, and both expectations should be subject to the 
same constitutional standards.”); C. McKim Norton, Elimination of Incompatible Uses and 
Structures, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305, 305 (1955); Harland Bartholomew, Non-
Conforming Uses Destroy the Neighborhood, 15 J. LAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON. 96, 96-97 
(1939). 
 73. Daniel R. Mandelker, Prolonging the Nonconforming Use: Judicial Restriction of 
the Power to Zone in Iowa, 8 DRAKE L. REV. 23, 23 (1958) [hereinafter Mandelker, 
Prolonging the Nonconforming Use]. 
 74. See generally Serkin, supra note 6; see also Osborne M. Reynolds Jr., The 
Reasonableness of Amortization Periods for Nonconforming Uses – Balancing the Private 
Interest and the Public Welfare, 34 J. OF URB. & CONTEMP. L. 99 (1988); see also Mandelker, 
Prolonging the Nonconforming Use, supra, at 73. 
 75. See generally Serkin, supra note 6. 
 76. PATRICK J. ROHAN & ERIC DAMIAN KELLY, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 
41.01[1] (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2021). 
 77. See id. 
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Ben’s enjoyment of his land and reduces its market value.  Existing use 
protection thus seems like an arbitrary benefit for Al and a burden on 
Ben that stems from an irrational distinction between past and future land 
use choices.  Indeed, grandfathering of existing uses under non-zoning 
police power regulations sometimes invites judicial disapproval on the 
grounds that such exemptions are presumptively unfair.78 
Second, allowing nonconforming uses to persist undermines the 
effectiveness of zoning law in separating conflicting uses.79  Requiring 
that zoning regulations take effect only prospectively means that zoning 
changes will have little immediate effect in developed areas.80  Serkin 
notes that “[w]orking around existing uses can severely limit the efficacy 
of zoning and other comprehensive land use planning, potentially 
transforming prospective planning into a mere description and 
codification of existing conditions.”81 
Third, existing use protection gives landowners questionable 
incentives.82  Rather than trying to anticipate whether a contemplated 
land use will be consistent with the future development of the 
neighborhood, existing use protection encourages speedy development 
of potentially controversial uses so as to gain vested rights.83  Existing 
use protection can thus lead to inefficient races between developers and 
local governments in which the developer tries to develop a lot before a 
property is rezoned so as to receive nonconforming use protection.84  
Developers would have less incentive to race to secure vested rights if 
local governments retained the right to apply subsequent zoning changes 
to the property.85  Existing use protection likewise encourages property 
owners to make excessive, socially inefficient investments in 
burdensome uses, knowing that existing use protection will shield them 
from reasonable, cost-justified land use regulations.86  If landowners 
knew that burdensome uses risked triggering zoning changes, they 
would be more careful to balance their own interests with those of 
neighbors who might be adversely affected by new development. 
 
 78. See Katt v. Vill. of Sturtevant, 70 N.W.2d 188, 188-89 (Wis. 1955) (invalidating an 
exemption for existing mink farms from a regulation prohibiting their operation); see 
WILLIAMS, JR. & TAYLOR, supra note 4, § 117.5. 
 79. See Serkin, supra note 6, at 1225. 
 80. See id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 1283. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Serkin, supra note 6, at 1283. 
 86. Id. at 1283-85. 
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Finally, nonconforming use protection sometimes has the 
unintended consequence of creating a local monopoly.87  For example, a 
nonconforming store in a residential district has a local monopoly of 
indefinite, and in principle perpetual, duration.88  This may have the 
perverse effect of entrenching conforming uses that would otherwise be 
uneconomical.  It seems unfair to give owners of nonconforming 
businesses a windfall for operating a business in a location deemed 
inappropriate by the zoning code.  Moreover, the prospect of a local 
monopoly may encourage existing businesses to lobby for more 
restrictive zoning so as to gain a competitive advantage.89   
Serkin rebuts a number of common arguments for categorical 
protection of existing uses.  First, he notes that application of zoning 
regulation to existing uses is only retroactive in the weak sense that is 
considered unobjectionable in most other contexts.90  A new zoning 
regulation does not make the existence of a nonconforming use illegal 
prior to its enactment, but merely makes any future continuation of the 
nonconformity illegal.  To use terminology introduced by Stephen 
Munzer, a law that is weakly prospective,91 such as a new health 
regulation prohibiting use of a newly discovered carcinogen in 
manufacturing, would sanction manufacturers only for future use of the 
carcinogen.  It would not, however, provide any safe harbor for 
manufacturers who made costly investments in reliance on the old legal 
regime in which the carcinogen could be used freely.  By contrast, a 
strongly prospective application of the regulation would exempt from 
the force of the regulation equipment already in use, which could only 
be operated using the carcinogen, but forbid the use of any subsequently 
purchased equipment.92  Zoning regulations are typically strongly 
prospective insofar as they apply only to new structures and new 
activities and preserve the legal status of uses that reflect past decisions 
made by landowners so long as such choices were legal at the time they 
 
 87. See id. at 1235 n.61. 
 88. E.g., Wickham v. Becker, 274 P. 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 1929) (invalidating zoning 
regulation that prohibited commercial development everywhere in a jurisdiction except in two 
small districts entirely occupied by existing businesses on grounds that this created local 
monopoly prohibiting competition with existing businesses). 
 89. E.g., Lippow v. City of Miami Beach, 68 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1953) (invalidating a 
zoning change on the grounds there the government could articulate no rationale other than 
protection of the economic interests of neighboring businesses); Charnofree Corp. v. City of 
Miami Beach, 76 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1954) (invalidating a zoning regulation on the grounds that 
it had no discernible role in protecting the health, safety or morals of the community, but 
appeared instead designed to protect existing businesses from new competition). See generally 
James Dabney, Antitrust Aspects of Anticompetitive Zoning, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 435 (1979). 
 90. Serkin, supra note 6, at 1262-65. 
 91. Stephen R. Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 383 (1977). 
 92. See id. at 383. 
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were made.93  Regulation of existing uses, Serkin claims, is not 
inherently any more objectionable than all manner of other health, 
safety, and environmental regulations that impose costs on regulated 
parties as a result of choices made under the pre-existing legal regime.94  
Abandoning existing use protection would make zoning law weakly 
prospective rather than strongly prospective.  Rather than reflecting a 
general policy against retroactive legislation, existing use protection 
represents a sort of grandfathering that is at least mildly atypical in 
regulatory policy. 
Second, Serkin argues that existing uses are not categorically 
different from legal rights to build a structure or engage in an activity in 
the future.95  According to Serkin, categorical protection of existing uses 
reflects a sort of irrational preference for foregone losses as opposed to 
out-of-pocket expenses.96  Prohibition of existing uses does not 
necessarily impose greater losses on property owners than does the 
prohibition of future uses.97  For example, downzoning a vacant lot in a 
fast-growing urban area to prohibit any sort of dense development may 
reduce the lot’s value by a huge percentage.  If, on the other hand, the 
lot contained a junkyard, changing zoning regulations to prohibit this use 
might have virtually no effect on the lot’s market value.  Application of 
the latter, but not the former, zoning regulation might be blocked by the 
status of the junkyard as an existing use.98  People may be prone to 
overvalue out-of-pocket losses as compared with foregone future 
gains.99  This sort of cognitive bias might explain why existing uses have 
special status, but it does not justify it.  Similarly, though an existing use 
may be good evidence of the subjective expectations of a property 
owner, it is not clear why these expectations should receive any more 
protection than subjective expectations of future planned uses.100  In 
most areas, the law is not especially solicitous of the latter sort of 
expectations.101  More generally, appealing to subjective expectations in 
this context is problematic.  Since these expectations are shaped by the 
fact that existing uses receive legal protection, appeal to such 
 
 93. Serkin, supra note 6, at 1224-25. 
 94. Id. at 1289. 
 95. See id. at 1268. 
 96. See id. at 1267. 
 97. Id. at 1267-68. 
 98. This result is not certain since it is conceivable that the junk yard could be regulated 
as a nuisance. 
 99. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979) (introducing prospect theory, which suggests 
that people tend to value losses more than they value exactly equivalent gains). 
 100. Serkin, supra note 6, at 1275-77. 
 101. See id. at 1276-77. 
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expectations to justify legal protection is circular.  If existing uses were 
not exempt from most zoning laws, landowners would revise their 
expectations in light of the new legal rule. 
Third, in response to those who argue that existing use protection is 
necessary because of the vulnerability of property owners to abusive 
regulation, Serkin argues that the interests of those who seek to protect 
existing uses usually receive adequate consideration in ordinary 
democratic political processes.102  Property owners who benefit from 
existing use protection are readily identifiable, likely to have a 
significant personal stake in the issue, and likely to be able to coordinate 
with one another.103  By contrast, the beneficiaries of zoning changes are 
usually more numerous, each have lower personal stakes in the outcome 
and in many cases, are as yet unknown future owners of neighboring 
properties.104  Basic principles of public choice theory suggest that 
owners of non-conformities who have a significant individual stake in 
zoning laws and know when they will be personally affected are likely 
to defend their interests effectively through the political process.105  
Serkin concludes that blanket protection of existing uses is unjustified.106  
Although grandfathering existing uses and structures might be advisable 
in cases in which the balance of interests tips in favor of existing use 
protection, local governments should be given the power to terminate 
nonconformities and, may exercise it without violating generally 
applicable takings and due process standards.107 
III. TWO MODELS OF ZONING REGULATION 
My defense of existing use protection will proceed in two stages. 
First, I discuss the place of existing use protection in the context of two 
distinct models of zoning regulation.  Second, I show why treating past 
and future land use choices asymmetrically makes sense given the 
normative function of property rights.  In this section I will explore two 
basic models for zoning regulation—comprehensive planning and 
bargaining—and show that the logic of each model supports existing use 
protection.  Both models are ideal types.  Zoning practice includes 
 
 102. See id. at 1279. 
 103. Id. at 1278-80. Serkin notes, however, that since owners of nonconformities are 
unlikely to be able to exit a hostile jurisdiction at low cost, they may be particularly vulnerable 
to exploitation by local governments. Id. at 1280. The political economy of land use regulation 
does not, therefore, provide decisive reasons to favor or oppose special treatment of existing 
uses. Id. 
 104. Serkin, supra note 6, at 1278-80. 
 105. See id. 
 106. Id. at 1290-91. 
 107. See id. at 1288-89. 
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elements of both.  Zoning regulation was originally conceived of as a 
planning regulation and has evolved over the course of the twentieth 
century to incorporate aspects of the bargaining model.108  Prohibition of 
existing uses is in tension with both models of zoning.  It is disfavored 
under the comprehensive planning model because plans are primarily 
guides for future development rather than tools to pre-existing land use 
conflicts.109  To the extent that an existing use is a product of a bargain 
between a developer and the local government, allowing the government 
to prohibit existing uses gives at least the appearance of the government 
going back on its word.  Moreover, the inability of the government to 
commit to protecting a developer from subsequent zoning changes could 
significantly undermine the credibility in negotiations and thus be an 
impediment to reaching agreements advantageous for local government. 
A. Zoning and Planning 
As a historical matter, zoning regulations are closely connected to 
the idea of comprehensive land use planning.  Zoning, as originally 
conceived, involved the creation of comprehensive zoning maps that 
divide all territory in a given jurisdiction into separate zones for different 
types of uses.110  The zoning map was to guide development throughout 
a jurisdiction and put landowners on notice about which general sorts of 
development would be permitted on their land.111  Zoning codes were 
seen as vehicles to implement land use plans and comprehensive 
planning as a means to constrain arbitrary or haphazard application of 
zoning regulations.112  Although early zoning codes did contain a process 
for variances and amendments, these were intended for use in 
exceptional cases.113  Rezonings are permissible under the Standard State 
 
 108. Philip L. Fraietta, Contract and Conditional Zoning Without Romance: A Public 
Choice Analysis, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 1923, 1926-30 (2013). 
 109. Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 
1154, 1155 (1955). 
 110. Zoning and Conditional Use Permits, INST. FOR LOC. GOV’T, https://www.ca-
ilg.org/hn-online-guide/zoning-and-conditional-use-permits (last visited Apr. 2, 2021). 
 111. WILLIAMS, JR. & TAYLOR, supra note 4, § 17.6. 
 112. Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 
1154, 1154 (1955) (“For to the extent that zoning is properly to be conceived of as the partial 
implementation of a plan of broader scope, zoning without planning lacks coherence and 
discipline in the pursuit of goals of public welfare which the whole municipal regulatory 
process is supposed to serve.”); Chamberlain & Pierson, supra note 52, at 187 (“So, even 
though a court approves of the principle of zoning as embodied in the statute, it will not sustain 
an ordinance which is not enacted in accordance with any ‘well-considered plan,’ but is 
arbitrary and unreasonable in its requirements.”). 
 113. Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model 
for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use 
Decisions: Installment One, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 11-12 (2005); Shelby D. Green, 
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Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) but procedurally cumbersome as befitting 
a tool to be used only in rare circumstances.114  An extreme version of 
this position is reflected in the “change or mistake” rule in several states, 
which require a showing of changed circumstances or a mistake in the 
original zoning code in order to revise any existing zoning 
designation.115  The expectation, however, was that in the vast majority 
of cases, landowners seeking to develop their land would apply for a 
building permit, which would be granted or denied depending on 
whether the proposed development complied with the pre-existing 
zoning regulations.116  The original conception of zoning thus was that 
most important questions would be settled by a comprehensive code and 
that zoning determinations specific to particular parcels of land—
variances, and special permits—would play a secondary role and be 
employed only to address exceptional, unforeseen circumstances.117 
Although most courts were apparently willing to uphold zoning 
codes that were prospective, comprehensive, and included procedural 
protections for landowners, codes that did not fit the comprehensive 
planning model were vulnerable to legal challenge.  Early decisions 
striking down zoning regulations occurred in instances in which there 
was no zoning enabling act,118 there was no comprehensive map or 
plan,119 or zoning was piecemeal.120  A leading early zoning proponent 
argued that these deficiencies, as well as the lack of provision for zoning 
appeals, explained the leading cases invalidating zoning regulations.121  
Partially in response to such concerns, the Standard Zoning Enabling 
Act, upon which many of the early zoning codes were modeled,122 stated 
that zoning “regulations shall be made in accordance with a 
comprehensive plan.”123  There is a long running controversy over how 
 
Development Agreements: Bargained-For Zoning That Is Neither Illegal Contract Nor 
Conditional Zoning, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 387 (2004). 
 114. Green, supra note 113, at 386-88. 
 115. WILLIAMS, JR. & TAYLOR, supra note 4, § 7.6. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Camacho, supra note 113, at 11-12; Green, supra note 113, at 387. 
 118. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Evraiff, 256 S.W. 489, 489-90 (Mo. 1923); State ex rel. 
Better Built Home & Mortgage Co. v. McKelvey, 256 S. W. 495, 495 (Mo. 1923); State ex 
rel. Penrose Inv. Co. v. McKelvey, 256 S.W. 474, 474 (Mo. 1923). 
 119. See, e.g., Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513, 517 (Tex. 1921). 
 120. Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477 (1925). 
 121. Edward M. Bassett, Constitutionality of Zoning in Light of Recent Court Decisions, 
13 NAT’L MUN. REV. 492, 494 (1924). 
 122. Green, supra note 113, at 385. 
 123. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 
3, at 6 n.22 (rev. ed. 1926). 
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to understand the comprehensive plan requirement.124  In the early years 
of zoning, local governments were not required to enact separate plans 
and many created zoning codes in the absence of a comprehensive 
plan.125  This lead courts to find that in such cases, the zoning map was 
itself a comprehensive plan.126  In the mid-twentieth century, a number 
of states, including California and Florida, adopted laws that required 
local governments to adopt a comprehensive plan before issuing zoning 
regulations.127  Most states still do not require a locality to create a 
comprehensive plan in order to zone,128 but even in these states, courts 
usually require that the zoning code itself be comprehensive rather than 
piecemeal.129  At a minimum, a plan should cover the entire territory 
over which the planning agency has jurisdiction.130  Zoning decisions 
that appear arbitrary in light of the larger code are vulnerable to 
invalidation as illegal “spot zoning.”131  By contrast, conformity to a 
comprehensive plan is sometimes treated as evidence against a 
regulatory taking claim.132 
The requirement of conformity to a comprehensive plan is in part 
motivated by concern to justify particular zoning regulations as serving 
important public ends and not merely as a means to resolve private 
conflicts between neighbors.133  A comprehensive scheme to channel 
development in any particular jurisdiction is thought to benefit the 
community as a whole.  Courts upholding land use regulation typically 
 
 124. See Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem 
of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 860-63 (1983) (discussing the evolution of “plan 
jurisprudence” in the mid-twentieth century). 
 125. Haar, supra note 109, at 1157. 
 126. Edward J. Sullivan, Answered Prayers: The Dilemma of Binding Plans, in PLANNING 
REFORM IN THE NEW CENTURY 138 (Daniel R. Mandelker ed., 2004). 
 127. Id. 
 128. MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 4, § 3.14. 
 129. Id.; WILLIAMS, JR. & TAYLOR, supra note 4, § 7.5. 
 130. ROHAN & KELLY, supra note 16, § 37.01[1][b]. 
 131. JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 2, § 5.10 (“A rezoning that looks like a spot on 
the zoning map raises a ‘red flag’ of suspicion that the rezoning may have been done to serve 
private, not public, interests.  If the rezoning is shown to be in accord with the plan, that 
concern is dispelled.”); 2 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, J. RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND 
PLANNING § 28.01 (4th ed. 2020) (“No one particular characteristic associated with spot 
zoning, except a failure to comply with at least the spirit of a comprehensive plan, is 
necessarily fatal to the amendment.”). 
 132. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 336-
40 (2002); Norbeck Vill. Joint Venture v. Montgomery Cty. Council, 254 A.2d 700, 700 (Md. 
1969); MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 4, § 3.18. 
 133. Haar, supra note 109, at 1157-58 (“With the heavy presumption of constitutional 
validity that attaches to legislation purportedly under the police power, and the difficulty in 
judicially applying a ‘reasonableness’ standard, there is danger that zoning, considered as a 
self-contained activity rather than as a means to a broader end, may tyrannize individual 
property owners.”). 
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point out the systemic nature of these benefits.134  The plan imposes a 
system of restrictions on property owners so that each owner is restricted 
somewhat in her use of her property but benefits from the restrictions 
imposed on neighboring property owners.135  From the early days of 
zoning, courts have suggested that state authority to regulate non-
nuisance land uses through zoning law is connected to the status of 
zoning regulation as a planning instrument.  For instance, Jones v. City 
of Los Angeles, which held that Los Angeles could not use zoning law 
to prohibit an existing business that was not a nuisance, noted that courts 
“have recognized that the right to use private property may be restricted 
by an ordinance which follows a reasonable plan, even though the use is 
neither a nuisance per se, nor a menace to the health, safety or morals in 
the particular district from which it is excluded.”136  More recently, the 
Court in Kelo suggested that conformity with a comprehensive plan is 
evidence of a public use even when the ultimate recipient of the land 
taken by eminent domain is a private party.137 
B. The Role of Existing Use Protection in Comprehensive Zoning 
As will be explained presently, the comprehensive planning model 
of zoning is today, at best, a gross oversimplification of the nature of 
zoning.  Nevertheless, the roots of zoning regulation in comprehensive 
land use planning helps to explain the ambiguous status of 
nonconformities.  Commitment to comprehensive planning lead early 
zoning advocates to regard nonconformities unfavorably.  Non-
conforming uses undermine the uniformity of well-designed plans.  
Insofar as the aim of a comprehensive planning is strict separation of 
uses, the persistence of nonconforming uses perpetuates industrial or 
commercial activities in an undesirable proximity to residential areas.  
Insofar as the aims are aesthetic, nonconforming uses are eyesores on an 
otherwise well-ordered landscape. 
Despite the obvious tension between comprehensive zoning and the 
protection of existing uses, the logic of comprehensive planning on 
 
 134. E.g., Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391-94 (1926); Golden 
v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 376-78 (N.Y. 1972). 
 135. Alfred Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 HARV. L. REV. 834, 839 (1924) (“In 
the case of a zone plan, each piece of property pays, in the form of reasonable regulation of 
its use, for the protection which the plan gives to all property lying within the boundaries of 
the plan.”). 
 136. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 295 P. 14, 17 (Cal. 1930). 
 137. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483-84 (2005); Nicole Stelle Garnett, 
Planning as Public Use?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 444 (2007). But see Gideon Kanner, We 
Don’t Have to Follow Any Stinkin’ Planning – Sorry About That, Justice Stevens, 39 URB. L. 
529, 530 (2007) (arguing the Kelo wildly overstates that legal force of comprehensive plans 
and adopts a naïve view of their purposes and legal significance). 
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balance supports protection of existing uses.  Zoning regulations that 
implement comprehensive plans are oriented toward guiding future 
development rather than rearranging existing uses and structures.138  The 
comprehensive planning model of zoning suggests that these regulations 
should not be applied to existing non-nuisance land uses for at least five 
reasons. 
First, existing use protection mitigates the potential unfairness in 
regulations that treat similarly situated landowners differently.  Zoning 
regulations differ from most other police power regulations in that they 
impose a non-uniform set of rules.  The function of a zoning code is to 
establish different rules in different sectors so as to separate conflicting 
uses.  Zoning laws, therefore, permit activities in one area that they 
prohibit in another.  By contrast, ordinary police power regulations are 
general in nature.139  They apply uniform rules across a given 
jurisdiction.140  A checkerboard statute—a statute that imposes different 
rules according to some entirely arbitrary pattern—is a stock example of 
an unjust law.141  For example, a health regulation that applied to 
restaurants located in even-numbered streets, but not odd-numbered 
streets, would seem obviously unjust.  A court would likely invalidate it 
as arbitrary and capricious or as a violation of equal protection.  Zoning 
codes, however, are checkerboard statutes by design: the point of the 
code is to apply different rules to different neighborhoods.  Two highly 
similar plots of land with identical uses may be treated very differently 
depending on where lines are drawn on a map.  Euclidian zoners try, of 
course, to separate uses so that a use will be permitted where it fits with 
its neighbors but prohibited where it does not.142  However, the need to 
 
 138. JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 2, § 2.10 (“The rational, comprehensive 
planning process has four principal characteristics.  First, it is future-oriented, establishing 
goals and objectives for future land use and development approval or disapproval, and 
municipal expenditures for capital improvements such as road construction and the 
installation of municipal utilities.”). 
 139. See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 442-43 (1827). 
 140. E.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938); 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970). 
 141. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 179 (1986). Dworkin believes that zoning laws 
are unobjectionable despite their checkerboard nature because they are not “matters of 
principle.” This seems to miss an important feature of zoning regulation that differentiates it 
from most other forms of regulation. The checkerboard nature of zoning regulations is 
permissible because it is required for the regulation to fulfill its purpose. Application of other 
police power regulations to property owners on every other street would usually be regarded 
as unfair, even if the regulation did not concern a “matter of principle” by Dworkin’s lights, 
so long as it allocated non-trivial benefits or burdens. 
 142. Rachael Watsky, The Problems With Euclidean Zoning, BOS. U. SCH. L. (July 19, 
2018), http://sites.bu.edu/dome/2018/07/19/the-problems-with-euclidean-zoning/ (explaining 
that the term comes from the Supreme Court case Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, and 
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draw sharp boundaries means that some decisions will necessarily be 
somewhat arbitrary: for a given unzoned area, there is not likely to be a 
single unique map dictated by basic principles of zoning.  Insofar as a 
zoning code attempts to do more than merely formalize existing 
distinctions between neighborhoods, it will impose rules that treat 
similar parcels of land differently.  The contrast with ordinary police 
power regulations is stark: checkerboard regulations concerning health, 
safety, personal liberty, or any other matter serious enough to justify the 
imposition of significant sanctions are inherently suspicious.143  A 
checkerboard zoning map, on the other hand, is an entirely 
unexceptionable outcome that serves the underlying purpose of 
separating incompatible uses.144  Permitting continuation of existing uses 
protects landowners to a considerable extent from ending up on the 
wrong side of necessarily somewhat arbitrary lines. 
Second, the requirement of comprehensiveness and prospective 
nature of zoning are both serve to spread the benefits and burdens of 
zoning regulation as widely as possible.  Commentators often present 
conforming use protection as a means of reducing political opposition 
by “grandfathering” those property owners most likely to object.145  But 
this is the flip side of a more principled rationale: existing use protection 
reduces the risk that burdens of zoning will be highly concentrated 
among a small number of landowners who suffer large losses.146  
Meanwhile, the requirement that zoning codes are comprehensive 
increases the probability that all landowners in the jurisdiction will 
benefit in the long run.  A well-conceived zoning code will tend to 
produce widely dispersed benefits by reducing the chances that 
neighbors will develop inconsistent land uses, protecting the character 
and aesthetics of neighborhoods, expanding the tax base by increasing 
property values, and channeling future development in ways that benefit 
existing property owners.  As already noted, comprehensive land use 
planning was originally touted as having benefits for all landowners, 
including those who were burdened by costly new restrictions on how 
they could use their land.147  The extent to which zoning actually delivers 
on these promises is controversial.  Proponents, however, generally 
argue that well-designed zoning codes benefit an entire community and 
 
describes zoning which “divides towns into districts based on permitted uses, and in so doing, 
creates specific zones where certain land uses are permitted or prohibited”). 
 143. See DWORKIN, supra note 141, at 179. 
 144. See id. 
 145. E.g., JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.31. 
 146. See Serkin, supra note 6, at 1267. 
 147. See Haar, supra note 109, at 1154; Chamberlain & Pierson, supra note 52, at 187. 
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not only those landowners who wish to block development by their 
immediate neighbors.148 
The wide dispersal of benefits and burdens of comprehensive 
zoning is often cited by both the Supreme Court149 and by lower courts150 
as a factor in upholding zoning regulations.  Property owners who are 
burdened by zoning restrictions receive at least partial compensation in 
the form of valuable restrictions on the land use choices of their 
neighbors.151  Reciprocal advantage is a long-running theme in 
regulatory takings jurisprudence dating back to Justice Holmes opinion 
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.152  Defenders of land use 
regulations tend to present them as an exchange of benefits and burdens 
(perhaps not perfectly equal) rather than as a one-way imposition of 
 
 148. See, e.g., Peter Barnes, How Zoning Regulations Benefit Communities, YAHOO! FIN. 
(Feb. 4, 2016), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/zoning-regulations-benefit-communities-
050508613.html. 
 149. E.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1072-73 (1992) (Stevens J., 
dissenting) (“We have, therefore, in our takings law frequently looked to the generality of a 
regulation of property. For example, in the case of so-called ‘developmental exactions,’ we 
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bear the burden’ of a broader problem not of his own making. Nollan, 483 U.S., at 835, n.4; 
see also Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 23 (1988) . . . Perhaps the most familiar application 
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regulation is far less likely to constitute a taking if it is part of a general and comprehensive 
land-use plan, see Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); conversely, ‘spot zoning’ 
is far more likely to constitute a taking, see Penn Central, 438 U.S., at 132, and n. 28.”); Agins 
v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980), abrogated by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 
544 U.S. 528 (2005) (“The zoning ordinances benefit the appellants as well as the public by 
serving the city’s interest in assuring careful and orderly development of residential property 
with provision for open-space areas. There is no indication that the appellants’ 5-acre tract is 
the only property affected by the ordinances. Appellants therefore will share with other owners 
the benefits and burdens of the city’s exercise of its police power.”). 
 150. San Remo Hotel v. City & Cty. of San Francisco., 41 P.3d 87, 98 (Cal. 2002) (“The 
breadth or narrowness of the class burdened by the regulation, the extent to which a regulation 
defeats the owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the extent to which the 
affected property is also benefited by the regulation are certainly pertinent to whether a 
regulation works a taking.”); Haas v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117, 1121 (9th 
Cir. 1979) (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 133-34 n.30 
(1978) (“The record contains not the slightest suggestion that the land use regulations at issue 
involved ‘reverse spot’ zoning. On the contrary, the land use controls were part of a 
comprehensive plan for the development of the City to preserve aesthetic values and other 
general welfare interests of the inhabitants. The land use restrictions ‘were reasonably related 
to the implementation of a policy . . . expected to produce a widespread public benefit and 
applicable to all similarly situated property.’ All of Haas’ neighbors are subject to the same 
restrictions upon the future development of their property as those imposed upon Haas. To be 
sure, at the moment, Haas appears to have suffered a disproportionate impact because no other 
affected landowner has as large a parcel of undeveloped land as does Haas. Nevertheless, all 
of the landowners in the Russian Hill area are no more able than is Haas to redevelop their 
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 151. See Haas, 605 F.2d at 1121. 
 152. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); see generally Thomas W. Merrill, 
The Character of the Governmental Action, 36 VT. L. REV. 649 (2012). 
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restrictions in a property owner.  In Penn Central, part of the 
disagreement between Justice Brennan’s majority opinion and Justice 
Rehnquist’s dissent hinged on whether the historic landmark designation 
of Grand Central Station should be seen as part of a system of regulation 
of historically significant buildings with broad advantages accruing to 
all property owners or as an isolated imposition on the owners of Grand 
Central Station for the benefit of others.153  Justice Brennan contrasted 
New York City’s policy of historical preservation with illegal spot 
zoning: 
In contrast to discriminatory zoning, which is the antithesis of land-
use control as part of some comprehensive plan, the New York City 
law embodies a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of historic 
or aesthetic interests wherever they might be found in the city, and 
as noted, over 400 landmarks and 31 historic districts have been 
designated pursuant to this plan.154 
Rehnquist agreed that zoning regulations were constitutionally 
permissible because although they “at times reduce[] individual property 
values, the burden is shared relatively evenly and it is reasonable to 
conclude that on the whole an individual who is harmed by one aspect 
of the zoning will be benefited by another.”155  But he argued that the 
“multimillion dollar loss . . . imposed . . . is uniquely felt and is not offset 
by any benefits flowing from the preservation of some 400 other 
‘landmarks’ in New York City.”156 
Existing use protection serves to balance the burdens and benefits 
of regulation somewhat more equally.  Even well-designed zoning codes 
pose a risk that the burdens of zoning regulation will be concentrated 
among only a few property owners.  Although whether a use is an 
existing use or a future use does not perfectly track the burden imposed 
by new zoning regulations, owners of nonconforming properties are one 
of the two groups (along with owners of undeveloped property) that 
would be most likely to suffer large losses as a result of new zoning 
regulations.157  Protection of existing uses mitigates the burdens on those 
property owners whose hitherto legal activities are proscribed by the new 
code.158  It thereby decreases the odds that zoning regulation will 
function primarily to transfer wealth from one group of property owners 
(the nonconformers) to another (the conformers).  A new zoning law that 
 
 153. See Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 152-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 154. Id. at 132. 
 155. Id. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Ellickson, supra note 11, at 699-701. 
 158. See Serkin, supra note 6, at 1224-25. 
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applied equally to existing and future uses would have quite different 
effects on landowners depending on their present activities.  Owners of 
land devoted to uses prohibited by the new code would be 
disproportionately burdened while other landowners would 
disproportionately benefit.  Strongly prospective zoning regulations, by 
contrast, have more similar implications for all landowners in a given 
zone.  Owners of both conforming and nonconforming properties are 
forbidden from commencing any future use inconsistent with the new 
zoning regulation.159  Although owners of nonconforming properties 
may gain some special advantage from being allowed to continue 
nonconforming activities, this advantage is limited by the prohibition on 
expanding nonconforming uses or switching to another type of use.160  
Nonconforming houses cannot be expanded and sometimes cannot be 
rebuilt.  Businesses are not permitted to expand, and commercial and 
industrial properties cannot be converted to a new use.161  Owners of 
nonconformities are, therefore, burdened by new regulations, usually to 
a greater extent than their neighbors.  And because existing use 
protection does not immunize landowners who operate nuisances, land 
uses that impose particularly heavy burdens on their neighbors are not 
protected.162 
Concern that losses from zoning regulation are not excessively 
concentrated is especially pressing in light of a third feature of 
comprehensive land use planning: zoning serves many purposes that are 
far less urgent than the removal of nuisances.  This factor seems to be 
central to the reasoning in Jones v. City of Los Angeles, which blocked 
Los Angeles’ attempt to require removal of existing facilities for the 
mentally ill: 
Zoning is not so limited in its purposes. It may take into 
consideration factors which bear no relation to the public health, 
safety or morals, but which come within the meaning of the broader 
term “general welfare”. It deals with many uses of property which 
are in no way harmful. If its objects are so much broader than those 
of nuisance regulation; if its invasion of private property interests is 
more extensive; and if the public necessity to justify its exercise need 
not be so pressing, then does it not follow that its means of regulation 
 
 159. E.g., CITY OF SAN JOSE, DEP’T OF PLANNING, BLDG. & CODE ENF’T, WHAT IS A 
LEGAL NONCONFORMING USE? (2003), 
https://www.sanjoseca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument?id=15487. 
 160. See supra Part II.A. 
 161. See id. 
 162. See Dix W. Noel, Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 473 
(1941). 
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must be more reasonable and less destructive of established 
interests?163 
Zoning codes prohibit structures and uses that are not, in the vast 
majority of cases, socially undesirable.164  The objectives of zoning are 
extremely varied and include prevention of conflicting uses, protection 
of the tax base, environmental protection, aesthetic appeal and 
uniformity, prevention of overcrowding, regulation of access to locally 
provided public goods, public health and safety, enhancement of 
property values, etc.165  In order to serve these ends, zoning regulations 
are applied selectively so that extremely similar parcels of land with 
identical uses may be subject to differing legal regimes depending on 
where they are located.  And the rules within a given zone are likely to 
render some properties nonconforming even if they are devoted to the 
right general sort of activity: residential property, for example, may be 
subject to regulations regarding occupancy, lot size, frontage, 
appearance, height, and so on.166  As a consequence, even a well-
designed zoning code will render nonconforming a variety of uses that 
cause, at most, only very marginal social harm.  Land uses that present 
serious threats to the peace, health, or safety of neighbors may be 
terminated as nuisances; it is not uncommon for courts to refuse to grant 
existing use protection on these grounds.167  This means that existing use 
protection only attaches to uses that cause small, more attenuated, or 
more abstract harms, including those of an aesthetic or more inchoate 
economic nature.  The social benefit of eliminating many 
nonconforming uses is often fairly attenuated.  It is possible that current 
limitations on nonconforming properties already go too far in many 
cases.  Nicole Garnett has recently argued that restrictions on altering or 
 
 163. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 295 P. 14, 17 (Cal. 1930) 
 164. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Amber Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 388 (“A nuisance may be 
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regulations are intended to cure.”). 
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 167. See, e.g., Brown v. Grant, 2 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). 
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expanding non-conforming uses contribute to urban decay in aging 
cities.168 
Interestingly, Kathy Kolnick found that even after the City of Los 
Angeles won a landmark legal victory in Hadacheck, allowing it to force 
commercial and industrial businesses out of newly designated residential 
districts, most of the now ostensibly illegal business continued on in their 
former locations.169  It is hard not to see this as evidence against the need 
for strict separation of uses, at least when the commercial uses involve 
laundries and the like (as was often the case with the businesses in 
question) rather than heavy industry or other obviously burdensome 
uses.170 
A fourth reason to favor existing use protection is that the use of 
zoning regulation to terminate existing structures and uses threaten to 
undermine the function of property rights of dividing spheres of 
authority.  Property rights define the sphere of control and set a baseline 
for subsequent voluntary modification of these rights and duties by 
contract.  They codify a norm of the following sort: “I respect my 
neighbor’s decisions with respect to her property, and she respects my 
decisions with respect to mine.”  There are, of course, borderline cases 
in which an act has significant effects on both properties.  A complete 
set of property rights will determine rights in such cases so that each 
property owner has a compatible set of rights and duties.171  The value 
of each property will depend on its attributes and the rights of the owner.  
Neighbors unhappy with their allotment of rights and duties may try to 
negotiate exchanges.172  For example, if I find it inconvenient that I am 
not allowed to drive over my neighbor’s lot, I might try to negotiate an 
easement that would allow me to do so. 
Rather than securing the voluntary agreements with neighbors, 
zoning regulation allows disaffected property owners to bypass common 
law remedies and voluntary negotiation in order to restrict the activities 
of their neighbors.  Protection of existing uses converts zoning 
regulation which prevents zoning law from being used as a tool for the 
mediation of law disputes and restricts it largely to the domain of 
 
 168. NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE, POLICING, AND THE 
RESTORATION OF URBAN AMERICA 198-99 (2010). 
 169. Kathy A. Kolnick, Order Before Zoning: Land Use Regulation in Los Angeles, 
1880–1915, at 245 (May 2008) (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Southern 
California), https://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/ref/collection/p15799coll127/id/61051. 
 170. Id. at 122. 
 171. Richard A. Epstein, Bundle-of-Rights Theory as a Bulwark Against Statist 
Conceptions of Private Property, 8 ECON J. WATCH 223, 230-32 (2011). 
 172. Ellickson, supra note 11, at 711-719. 
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prevention of land use conflicts and regulation of development.173  
Zoning regulation, in its present form, serves the dual function of 
preventing neighbors from developing inconsistent plans for their 
properties and assuring landowners that neighbors will not make 
undesirable changes.174  Allowing local governments to use zoning 
regulations to terminate existing uses would encourage aggressive 
actions against one’s neighbors’ present activities and does not 
discourage consensual resolution of land use disputes.  At worst, 
purchasing property next to nonconforming uses and then lobbying for 
zoning changes could be a business strategy.175  Permitting aggressive 
use of zoning regulation could create land use conflicts in situations 
where the current neighbors are not especially bothered by a 
nonconformity. 
The nuisance exception to existing use protection is consistent with 
the logic of zoning regulation being aimed at dispute avoidance rather 
than dispute resolution.  Nuisances are activities that impose significant 
and non-reciprocal burdens on neighbors: noise, foul odors, dangerous 
conditions, etc.176  Because there is no right to operate a nuisance under 
common law, eradication of such burdens is not an infringement of the 
property owner’s pre-existing legal rights, but merely enforcement of the 
pre-existing common law rights of neighbors.177  By contrast, regulation 
of lesser sorts of burdens does alter legal entitlements.  Prohibition of 
multi-family housing on a parcel might raise the land value of its 
neighbors if would-be buyers prefer not to live next to apartment 
buildings.  But because multi-family housing is not a nuisance, doing so 
alters the pre-existing distribution of legal rights.   
A fifth consideration in favor of applying comprehensive zoning 
codes only to future uses is that better alignment of the interests of 
landowners in a particular zone increases the chances of well-designed 
regulation.  Aside from any concern with the fairness of burdening the 
owners of non-conformities to benefit their neighbors, the prospect of 
terminating existing uses pits the interests of neighboring landowners 
against one another in regulatory policymaking.  Although one might 
 
 173. Or, perhaps, to regulate conflicts over development. 
 174. See Ellickson, supra note 11, at 699-701. 
 175. Under the current legal regime, entrepreneurs might purchase both a nonconforming 
property and adjacent parcels in order to capture economic gains from eliminating the 
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 177. See, e.g., Conrad v. City of Beebe, 388 S.W.3d 465, 469 (Ark. Ct. App. 2012). 
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wish that property owners seeking to terminate their neighbors’ existing 
uses will prevail in the zoning process only when the balance of policy 
considerations tilts in their favor, local zoning regulation depends on a 
host of local political dynamics aside from the merits of a proposed 
regulation.  Sometimes local governments may be justified in 
terminating existing uses, but often they will not.  By contrast, protection 
of existing uses sets up a regulatory context in which the interests of all 
landowners in a zone are better aligned.  When only prospective uses are 
prohibited, all landowners share in the benefits of restrictions on their 
neighbors’ activities, and all landowners, including owners of 
nonconforming properties, are burdened by the new restrictions.  The 
principal exception is owners of undeveloped property who wish to 
develop, who tend to be disproportionately burdened by new zoning 
rules.  Existing use protection, however, has no effect on this group. 
Classical zoning codes are a sort of public plan that is designed so 
as to minimize potential conflicts in the plans developed by private 
landowners and provide for orderly future development according to the 
principles of rational land use.178  The comprehensive nature of zoning 
codes produces widely dispersed benefits, but also subjects landowners 
to starkly different rules depending on where their property falls on the 
zoning map.179  The protection of existing uses mitigates the danger of 
highly concentrated costs and the potential unfairness of subjecting 
different landowners to different rules that may be based on the planning 
boards’ views of desirable future development rather than the present 
character of the neighborhood.  A zoning regulation not made according 
to some general plan is a use of regulatory authority to resolve a 
particular law use conflict.  Such a resolution, by its very nature, evades 
the common law principles that would have governed the conflict in its 
absence and thus should trigger concern land use law is being used for 
private ends.  As will be discussed below, zoning practice has evolved 
away from the planning model in some respects.  Nevertheless, the logic 
of comprehensive planning is one source of the intuition that existing 
uses should be treated differently than future uses. 
C. Bargaining and Contemporary Zoning 
Although the logic of comprehensive planning was central to the 
original understanding of zoning regulation, zoning practice in the 
United States has developed in ways that clearly are in tension with this 
model.  The level of foresight needed to translate a general and 
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somewhat abstract master plan into a detailed zoning code has often 
proven unrealistic for several reasons.  First, local governments find it 
difficult to project future conditions decades in advance.180  Second, the 
impact of development on local public infrastructure and public services 
makes local governments hesitant to adopt a permissive approach to 
zoning undeveloped land even when future development is anticipated 
and desired.181  Finally, the strict separation of uses contemplated by 
Euclidian zoning seems too restrictive in light of the advantages of 
mixed use neighborhoods.182  As skepticism about the feasibility and 
desirability of detailed, long-term land use planning has grown, zoning 
practice has evolved toward an approach that I will refer to as the 
“bargaining model.”183  Unlike the planning model, which suggests that 
new development should generally conform to a pre-existing 
comprehensive plan and comprehensive zoning code, new development 
under the bargaining model is the result of protracted, project-specific 
negotiation between a developer and a local government.184 
The perceived inadequacy of Euclidian zoning has changed zoning 
practice in a number of ways.  Local governments often do not zone most 
undeveloped land for intensive development but instead use restrictive 
zoning designations so as to make case-by-case zoning determinations 
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2021] IN PRAISE OF NONCONFORMITY 779 
and to retain leverage over developers.185  Restrictive zoning of 
undeveloped land forces developers to win approval for measures that 
alter existing zoning rules such as zoning variances, special use permits, 
zoning amendments as well as, in many instances, a site plan.186  The 
rise of negotiated zoning regulation has encouraged the use of 
“conditional zoning” arrangements.187  Under conditional zoning, 
developers agree to impose certain restrictions of the use of their 
property in exchange for receiving the zoning treatment necessary for a 
proposed development.188  Such conditions might either be attached 
administratively in a special permit or variance or be imposed as part of 
a rezoning.189  In response to the perceived inflexibility of traditional 
Euclidian zoning, new zoning designations have been developed to 
facilitate a more flexible approach.  “Floating zones” are defined in the 
zoning code, but not located on the zoning map until a developer submits 
a successful application to “land” the floating zone on a particular 
property.190  Planned Unit Developments (PUDs) allow developers to 
pursue mixed use projects that do not fit within traditional zoning 
categories.191  Because both floating zoning and PUDs are initiated by a 
developer and require individualized review, both types of zoning 
encourage increased bargaining and conditional zoning more 
generally.192 
All of these developments have increased the importance of 
negotiations between local governments and developers.  Courts have 
traditionally disapproved of “contract zoning” on the grounds that it is 
unconstitutional for a governmental body to contract away its police 
power. 193  Despite the long history of judicial disapproval of contract 
zoning, local governments now often conclude formal development 
 
 185. Babcock, supra note 4, at 32 (“[M]ost communities with areas faced with 
development pressure have adopted a ‘wait and see’ regulatory approach.  Large areas of 
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agreements with developers.194  And courts usually uphold such 
contracts so long as they do not go too far in freezing existing zoning 
regulations and thus abrogating the police power.195  These 
“development agreements” allow local governments to secure support 
for infrastructure upgrades in exchange for giving developers legal 
certainty at an earlier stage than they would under standard vested rights 
doctrine.196  More recently, some developers have negotiated 
Community Benefits Agreements with community groups representing 
neighbors and other interested parties under which the developer agrees 
to certain conditions in exchange for community groups agreeing not to 
oppose the development.197  The cumulative effect of these changes is 
that rather than reflecting the logic of a comprehensive plan, zoning 
decisions are now often made on a case-by-case basis.  As Vicki Been 
has observed, “zoning has moved from a set of rigid prescriptive rules 
about land use to a more flexible set of standards, which allow the 
specifics of the requirements imposed on each proposed development to 
vary with the threatened impacts of the project and the concerns of the 
various interest groups affected by the proposal.”198 
The rise of the bargaining model of land use regulation has several 
important implications for existing uses.  First, insofar as developments 
result from protracted negotiations between local governments and 
property owners, a subsequent adverse change in zoning regulation may 
give the appearance of reneging on an implicit agreement.  Although 
changing legal rules may appear unfair to those who have relied on the 
old rules, laws must sometimes change if we are to have a functional 
legal system.  Going back on bargained agreements is another matter 
altogether.  Because of constitutional limitations on abrogation of the 
police power, even bargained zoning designations are not legal 
contracts.199  Nevertheless, it smacks of unfairness for local governments 
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to revisit zoning decisions made at the conclusion of negations with a 
developer after the developer has made various concessions to secure a 
certain zoning designation.  The unsavory character of such zoning 
changes makes it more likely that courts will find them to be takings or 
violations of due process even when standard doctrinal analysis is 
equivocal and even when there is a strong case that the concessions to 
the developer were unwise as a matter of public policy. 
Second, bargaining between developers and local governments 
implicitly relies upon the grandfathering of existing uses to protect the 
interests of developers.  Because local governments are not 
constitutionally permitted to alienate police power by contract,200 
development agreements and the like that commit local governments to 
maintain a particular zoning designation far beyond the completion of a 
development are vulnerable to legal challenge.201  But because the 
developer obtains “vested rights” once building permits are granted, the 
developer can rely upon the zoning designation specified in the 
development agreement once the project is well underway.202  The 
agreement, therefore, functions as a sort of a bridge between the 
initiation of the project and vesting of rights.203  It relies on the 
background understanding that completed (and most partially 
completed) projects receive legal protection from subsequent zoning 
changes.204  After bargaining for the right to begin construction, the 
developer need not worry about the risks of subsequent zoning 
changes.205  This has value for local governments as well.  Without 
protection for existing uses, governmental pledges not to change zoning 
rules until rights vest would be less valuable because developers and 
their transferees might worry that subsequent officials could go back on 
an agreement.  For this reason, existing use protection probably increases 
local government’s ability to exact concessions in exchange for building 
permits. 
The importance of this consideration is difficult to assess.  In many 
cases, developers may have little reason, even absent existing use 
protection, to worry that zoning changes will threaten the legal status of 
a development or frighten potential buyers.  Local governments have a 
strong disincentive to choose zoning rules in ways that severely diminish 
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property values and thus threaten the tax base.206  On the other hand, 
legal certainty is appealing because it spares developers and those to 
whom they might sell property from having to assess the regulatory risk 
of rezoning in the distant future.  This might increase resale value by 
facilitating transfer to outsiders who know little about the local 
government, even in those cases in which the true regulatory risk is quite 
modest.  Developers’ preference for zoning regulation provides some 
evidence that their buyers value legal certainty and thus would react 
unfavorably to a legal regime that did not include existing use 
protection.207 
Third, to the extent that zoning regulation is done not according to 
a comprehensive plan, but rather on a case-by-case basis, the argument 
for terminating existing uses is much weaker.  Much of the original 
concern about the persistence of non-conforming property was that they 
undermine the benefits of rational planning.  But if zoning designations 
reflect a series of ad hoc deals with developers rather than a consistent 
policy to guide development, it is hard to see why this should be of 
special concern.  As Richard Babcock observed in an insightful 1972 
address, 
it is apparent that wait-and-see zoning makes traditional concepts of 
nonconforming use obsolete.  The whole concept of nonconforming 
uses depends on the self-executing regulations that have long-term 
stability.  The wait-and-see approach to zoning undercuts the very 
basis of the idea of ‘nonconforming use’ – the idea that there are 
meaningful regulations to which a use can ‘conform.’208 
Not only do case-by-case zoning decisions undercut the 
significance of nonconformity with zoning, they strengthen the case that 
elimination of nonconforming uses is unfair to their owners.  Requiring 
that property owners give up some valuable opportunities for future 
development is much more palatable if this is done as part of a scheme 
that gives benefits to the landowners who bear the burdens of land use 
regulation.  But if every zoning decision more or less stands on its own, 
then the benefits that a property owner receives from the restrictions on 
the rights of other landowners do not in any real sense depend on the 
same considerations that require restrictions on the property owner’s 
land use choices. 
Part of the reason for the rise of zoning by negotiation is the 
increasing importance of fiscal zoning.  Much contemporary zoning 
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regulation is aimed at protecting taxpayers by restricting access to local 
public goods.209  Minimum lot sizes, restrictions on multi-family 
dwellings, and other common regulations are centrally concerned with 
preventing residents from consuming far more in services than they 
contribute in tax dollars.210  They do so, not directly by charging for 
public services, but indirectly by preventing construction of residences 
that contribute relatively little to the tax base on a per capita basis.211  In 
such cases, the elimination of an existing use (assuming that the 
regulation is well designed to protect the local tax base) causes a transfer 
of wealth from the burdened landowner to other local residents.212  The 
fairness of termination of existing uses in such cases is questionable.  In 
many cases, the nonconformity will impose little non-fiscal burden on 
its neighbors since the reasons for (e.g., minimum lot sizes) have little 
or nothing to do with the impact on adjacent plots.  Whatever the merits 
of fiscal zoning in the abstract, it is difficult to see how it can justify 
forcing incumbent landowners to make costly alterations or to move 
away entirely.  When zoning is undertaken for fiscal reasons, it is likely 
that local governments would grandfather existing structures even if 
permitted to do otherwise by state government and the courts.  But were 
local jurisdiction given free rein, at least a few would probably use this 
power to force conversion of multi-family rental property into single 
family homes or undertake other exclusionary measures.  Existing use 
protection thus has value as a check on fiscal zoning. 
IV. ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
A. Property and Plans: The Value of Ownership 
Zoning regulation, both as originally conceived and as it has 
evolved over the twentieth century, has reshaped property rights in land.  
Early opponents perceived zoning regulation as a threat to the liberal 
conception of property.213  In this section, I will discuss the normative 
significance of property ownership, explore how zoning regulation 
posed a threat to liberal property rights and show how existing use 
protection represents a compromise between the interests of property 
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owners in control over their property and the need for greater public 
control over land use choices. 
The connection between property rights and freedom is central to 
the liberal tradition.  Anglo-American liberals, both right- and left-
leaning, have embraced this link, although they sometimes provided 
quite different analyses of the nature of freedom and its connection to 
property.214  The importance of property rights for John Locke’s account 
of liberal political order is well known.215  In this tradition, the right to 
own private property is a natural liberty that pre-exists government and 
serves as a limitation on the authority of the state.216  Sometimes less 
remembered, at least in the Anglo-American circles, is that German 
Idealists such as Kant, Hegel, and Fichte also saw a close connection 
between property ownership and freedom.217  It is this Kantian tradition 
that is especially interesting for present purposes.218  Kant, Hegel, and 
Fichte argued that property ownership is normatively important because 
it provides a sphere of exclusive control for property owners.219  Unlike 
Locke, who argued that property could be acquired by mixing one’s 
labor,220 Hegel and Fichte believed that property rights could be acquired 
merely by incorporating an unowned object into one’s plans.221  
According to this “will theory” of property, property rights are grounded 
in a person’s interest in acting freely.222  Incorporating an object into 
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one’s plans gives others a duty not to interfere with the object without 
permission because doing so interferes with the free choices of the 
property owner. 
Whether or not the “will theory” is a compelling theory of property 
acquisition, it illuminates an important part of the value of property 
ownership.  The normative function of private property, on the Kantian 
theory, is that it gives the property owner the right to use an object “set 
and pursue [her] own ends.”223  One’s property holdings create a sphere 
of control in which one can determine, revise, and carry out one’s freely 
chosen projects.  Property rights violations infringe on the right of the 
owner to set and revise ends free from outside interference.  The idea 
here is that once an object has been incorporated into a person’s plans, 
interfering with that object disrupts that person’s ability to make and 
carry out plans.  A truly free person is one who not only makes choices, 
but one whose choices are efficacious in the world.  Some choices are 
aimed at more or less immediate goals: I am thirsty and so drink the glass 
of water on the table.  Other goals, however, can only be achieved by 
plans that unfold over time.224  Complex plans may have a nested 
structure with many subplans that must be completed in order to achieve 
an overarching long-term goal.  I might do A today so that I can do B 
tomorrow, or so that I have the option of doing B or C tomorrow, or so 
that I will be able to do E, F, and G in exactly that order over the coming 
years.  Property ownership is important because property provides a 
material domain in which to make plans.   
A sphere of exclusive control allows a person to develop her plans 
over time without outside interference.  Because a property owner 
typically has the ultimate authority with respect to her property, property 
ownership allows a person to act in pursuit of long-range plans with 
confidence that her choices will be efficacious.  I can build a house on 
my land without worrying that others will tear it down or occupy it. I 
may plant a garden, decorate my house how I please, build a workshop 
in it (or not), and so on.  My personal property is likewise mine to use, 
store, exchange, give away or abandon as I please.  Land, however, has 
a special relationship to property as a means to exercise free agency 
because land ownership provides a physical expanse in which the 
owner’s decisions are, within broad limits, authoritative.  Personal 
 
one can affect that part of the sensible world without restricting the freedom of my efficacy.” 
FICHTE, supra note 217, §10 at 106; SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY ch. 5 (2011). 
 223. RIPSTEIN, supra note 217, at 67. 
 224. Plans have been the subject of much interesting recent work in moral and legal 
philosophy. See generally MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS AND PRACTICAL 
REASON (1999); SHAPIRO, supra note 222. I am concerned here primarily with planning by 
individuals, not the sort of collective plans considered by Shapiro. 
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property, however great its economic value or personal meaning, does 
not perform the same function because it does not provide a physical 
territory in which an owner’s decisions have authority.  Personal 
property is, moreover, likely to be insecure without territory where it can 
be safely stored.  Land ownership allows a person to form complex plans 
that unfold over time both by providing material resources to support 
these plans and by providing a domain of exclusive control in which the 
person may act without permission from others.  To take a mundane 
example, if I would like to construct and operate a car wash, I need both 
money to purchase building materials and equipment and a physical 
location suitable for building the car wash that is under my control.  My 
plan will be frustrated without either of these elements—without 
financial resources, I cannot acquire materials, but materials alone are of 
little use without a space in which I am entitled to build and operate a 
cash wash if I so choose. 
Although property rights are far from the only elements of a liberal 
society, property rights have a special relationship to this conception of 
what it is to be a free agent.  In contrast to liability rules, which provide 
only for monetary compensation in the event of damage to property, 
property rules protect the property owner’s ability to make decisions that 
have an effect over time without interference from others.225  A property 
owner may pursue their own plans without permission from neighbors 
or government officials.  A liability rule, by contrast, protects the 
financial interests of the right-holder, but does not give the right-holder 
the security of being able to make exclusive decisions.226  An object 
protected by a liability rule may be taken, damaged, or destroyed, and so 
the owner’s intentions with respect to the object are not legally protected, 
only her financial interest.227  Liability rules have the virtue of permitting 
efficient transfers of resources that might not otherwise occur because of 
transaction costs.228  Nevertheless, pure liability rules of this sort are not 
especially common.  Preference for defined spheres of control is, 
perhaps, part of the reason why liability rules are commonly used to 
provide compensation for unintentional damages such as accidents and 
the like but relatively rare when it comes to intentional damages. 
 
 225. On the nature of property rules, see generally Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus 
Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453 (2002); 
JAMES E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW (1997); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas 
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105-15 (1972). 
 226. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 225, at 1092. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 1109-10. 
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This analysis of the value of property ownership differs from the 
most prominent version of the will theory of property in contemporary 
legal theory.  Unlike Margaret Radin’s account of the role of property as 
constitutive of personhood, this strand of German Idealist thought does 
not reply on the property being constitutive of personhood and is not 
concerned with inalienability, sentimental value, or with the distinction 
between fungible and non-fungible property.229  In general, the ability to 
alienate property makes it more rather than less valuable as a means for 
the exercise of free agency.  And property can provide a sphere of 
decisional authority in which to pursue plans over time regardless of 
whether the owner identifies with it or believes it intrinsically important 
to personhood.  Even if objects of property are fungible and valued 
entirely for their instrumental role in one’s projects, violations of 
property rights may still pose a special threat to free agency.  A small 
business owner may value a business at far above its fair market value 
not merely because of personal identification with the business, but of 
the centrality of running the business to her life.  In Radin’s terms, each 
of the business assets may be fungible property for the owner in the sense 
that they have only instrumental value and are fully replaceable with 
goods readily available on the market.230  But the ability to conduct the 
business might be so central to the owner’s life plans that the ability to 
continue operating the business has tremendous non-financial value to 
the owner.  In this case, it is not some special personal relation to 
particular objects of property that is important but rather the ability to 
continue an activity that those objects enable.  Conceptualizing non-
economic interests primarily as “personhood” interests disregards 
important classes of normative concern.231 
The role of property in providing a sphere in which to develop plans 
over time provides reason to think that termination of an existing use or 
structure is categorically different from the termination of a hitherto 
unexercised option for future use.  Terminating an existing use frustrates 
 
 229. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 971-78 
(1982). Serkin observes that the sort of value Radin is concerned with in “Property and 
Personhood” has few implication for existing use protection. Serkin, supra note 6, at 1273-
74. This is correct, but seems to miss the more important point which is that property rights 
often have a special relationship to a person’s interests even when the object of property rights 
are fungible objects of no particular sentimental value. Disrupting a small business might do 
grievous damage to the important personal projects of the owner even if the property at 
issue—the land and capital goods needed to operate the business—is of purely instrumental 
value. 
 230. Radin, supra note 229, at 960 (defining “personal property” and “fungible property”). 
 231. Serkin addresses the non-pecuniary value of property largely in these terms and 
therefore misses the important connection between property and freedom. See Serkin, supra 
note 6, at 1269-70. 
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the ongoing projects of the property owner.  Businesses must be closed 
or relocated, houses altered, tenants evicted.  Frustration of an ongoing 
project compromises part of the point of property ownership.  By 
contrast, protection of existing uses allows property owners to begin new 
projects with confidence that these projects will not be disrupted by most 
new land use regulations.  Distinguishing between an owner’s interest in 
pursuing ongoing projects and her interest in freedom to choose between 
various options provides a principled reason to prohibit certain future, 
but not existing, uses of land under most circumstances.232  This is 
particularly the case when the existing use in question is a small business 
because in such cases, the owner and (and perhaps key employees) have 
a strong interest, both personal and financial, in not having their ongoing 
projects disrupted by new regulation. 
Serkin discounts the idea that existing use protection protects the 
property owner’s subjective expectations of future use, but his reasons 
for doing so are not compelling.  Serkin seems to conflate interests 
protected by a property rights with the extent of compensation available 
if that right is “taken” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment when 
he argues that an owner’s subjective valuation does not justify special 
protection for existing uses because subjective value not compensable in 
takings cases.233  He remarks, “[i]f, instead, the concern is genuinely 
with protecting subjective expectations—regardless of the impact on the 
property’s fair market value—the result is simply inconsistent with core 
takings doctrine.  When it comes to prospective future uses, the law does 
not even aspire to protect all genuine and reasonable expectations.”234  
This is too cramped an understanding of property rights.  As Henry 
Smith has emphasized in a slightly different context, there is a gap 
between the form of property rights and the values that they protect.235  
Property rules create boundaries that provide a sphere of individual 
control that may be valuable for any number of reasons.  That only some 
such interests are compensated in takings cases is not an argument for 
ignoring such considerations when considering the value of existing use 
protection.  Successful takings claims entitle a plaintiff to compensation 
 
 232. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1233 (1967) (describing 
existing use protection as reflecting special concern for the “distinctly crystallized 
expectation” of the landowner). 
 233. Id. at 1269-70. 
 234. Id. at 1276. 
 235. Henry E. Smith, Response, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and 
Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 962-63 (2009). 
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for the fair market value of the property taken.236  But property rights 
protect a range of interests beyond the market value of the property.  
Among these are an owner’s subjective, above market valuation 
(consumer surplus), personal autonomy, sentimental value, and business 
goodwill.237  Just because these kinds of value are not compensable in 
takings cases does not mean that they can be set aside when evaluating 
the wisdom of existing uses protection.  To the contrary, ignoring them 
is a particularly serious mistake when analyzing the value of existing use 
because a legal regime without existing use protection would not 
compensate property owners for these sort of damages even in cases 
where a zoning law is found to constitute a taking.  As will be discussed 
below, the failure to compensate business owners for lost goodwill is 
particularly worrisome in light of the value of existing use protection for 
small businesses. 
This account of the will theory of property is largely congruent with 
the scope of existing use protection.  Rights vest in a non-conforming 
use only when property owner takes a tangible, substantial step toward 
development.238  In much the same way, the will theory of property 
requires concrete action to establish ownership by communicating one’s 
intention to incorporate an object into one’s future plans.  Owners of 
nonconforming properties are permitted to carry on their present 
activities as long as they wish and make repairs necessary to do so, but 
are generally not permitted to change to a new nonconforming use.239  In 
most states, there is an exception for activities such as mining that, by 
their nature, expand under the diminishing asset doctrine.240  The pattern 
seems to be that past plans are respected, but future plans must conform 
to the new code.  Nonconforming use protection does not, however, 
protect plans that would be disrupted regardless of the new zoning code.  
Nonconforming structures destroyed by acts of god thus cannot be 
reconstructed even though normal maintenance is permissible.241   
Amortization of nonconforming uses is controversial in part 
because it presents a difficult case under this theory of non-conforming 
uses.  Amortization has the benefit of allowing the property owner to 
continue their present projects until they have recouped some or all of 
 
 236. Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for 
Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV., 677, 678 (2005). 
 237. Id. at 679 n.4. 
 238. MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 4, § 6.12. 
 239. ROHAN & KELLY, supra note 16, § 41.03[1]. 
 240. See, e.g., Hansen Bros. Enters. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 907 P.2d 1324, 1324 (Cal. 
1996). 
 241. See, e.g., Baird v. Bradley, 240 P.2d 1016, 1017 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952). 
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their investment.242  It also puts owners on notice that their 
nonconforming uses will be terminated, giving them time to rearrange 
their plans.243  Amortization is thus far more respectful of property 
owners’ interests in developing their projects than is immediate 
termination.  In general, amortization is appropriate in the case of 
discrete investments that are not embedded in some larger ongoing 
project or for uses of open land such as junkyards.  In such cases, 
property owners will be able to recoup most of their investment and will 
have time to adjust to the new legal circumstances.244  It is a less 
satisfactory response for nonconformities that require ongoing 
investments, including businesses and buildings.  The problem with 
amortization in such cases is that it threatens to make new investment 
uneconomical such that owner’s enjoyment of the property will be 
significantly compromised during the amortization period.  A decaying 
building or a small business starved of investment may not be sufficient 
for the property owner to recoup prior investments.  Amortization might 
be better than nothing at all, but for nonconforming uses involving 
complex commercial endeavors, amortization seems to seriously 
compromise the value of property ownership by threatening the viability 
of the owner’s personal or commercial plans.  In light of the obvious 
difficulties with amortizing whole businesses or residencies, it is 
probably not coincidental that disputes over amortization provisions 
have been disproportionately focused on nonconforming signs and 
billboards.245 
In response to frequent use of amortization to terminate 
nonconforming signs and billboards, statutes have been enacted in many 
states that forbid this practice.246  The foregoing argument provides 
limited support for such statutes.  Signs and billboards do not implicate 
many of the interests at stake in other existing use cases.  They are 
typically not essential to ongoing projects.  They do not require large 
ongoing investments of the sort that makes amortization of business 
problematic.  There is little reason to think, therefore, that signs should 
receive any special protection from land use regulation beyond an 
 
 242. Reynolds Jr., supra note 46, at 111 (1988). 
 243. Id. at 111. 
 244. See id. 
 245. See, e.g., Battaglini, v. Town of Red River, 669 P.2d 1082, 1082 (N.M. 1983); City 
of Fort Collins v. Root Outdoor Advert., Inc., 788 P.2d 149, 149 (Colo. 1990); see generally 
WILLIAMS, JR. & TAYLOR, supra note 4, § 124.6 (collecting amortization cases, a large 
proportion of which involve junkyards or other open storage). 
 246. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 70.20(2) (2005); see MANDELKER & WOLF, supra note 4, § 
5.78, n.422. 
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amortization period to allow the owner to recover sunk costs.247  This 
does not, however, justify broader use of amortization to terminate non-
nuisance structures and uses. 
B. Zoning and the New Logic of Property Rights 
Under common law principles governing land use choices before 
the advent of zoning, property owners had broad discretion to determine 
what to build and what to do on their land so long as they did not interfere 
with their neighbors’ use and enjoyment of their land.  Property rules 
protect a property owner’s freedom to choose between a range of options 
by allowing the property owner to forbid others from entering the 
property or interfering with it.  Deference to landowners’ choices about 
what to do with their property makes sense in light of this understanding 
of property as closely connected to freedom both from interference by 
the government and from one’s neighbors.  There have always, of 
course, been significant limitations on what property owners may do on 
their property.  Activities that burden neighboring property owners pit 
the interests of property owners against one another and thus require 
trade-offs between the interests of different landowners.  Nuisance law 
evolved to mediate these conflicts.  For the most part, however, land use 
decisions were made by property owners or their tenants.248 
The rise of zoning and other land use regulation has substantially 
changed the significance of property ownership.  It is no longer true that 
landowners have broad discretion about the use to which their land is 
put.  To the contrary, it is common in most developed areas for land use 
regulations to place rather strict limits on what property owners may or 
may not build or do.  And local governments have broad powers to 
impose new regulations.  Today, a landowner in a suburban residential 
 
 247. Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 43 N.Y.2d 468, 478 (N.Y. 1977) (“In contrast 
to a safety-motivated exercise of the police power, a regulation enacted to enhance the 
aesthetics of a community generally does not provide a compelling reason for immediate 
implementation with respect to existing structures or uses. True, the public will benefit from 
a more aesthetically beautiful community, but absent the urgency present in a safety-
motivated regulation, the immediate benefit gained does not outweigh the loss suffered by 
those individuals adversely affected.”). 
 248. It is possible that highly concentrated land holdings have some utility in this context. 
One possible virtue of feudal modes of land tenure is that landlords where in a position to 
mediate land use conflicts between tenants and tenants between sub-tenants. Most cities have 
long had fragmented land ownership. See Derek Keene, The property market in English towns, 
A.D. 1100-1600 in: D’UNE VILLE À L’AUTRE. STRUCTURES MATERIELLES ET ORGANISATION 
DE L’ESPACE DANS LES VILLES EUROPEENNES (XIIIe-XVIe siècle) 201, 221-25 (1989). But 
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building) gave business owners incentive to mitigate the burdens that their businesses imposed 
on neighbors. See generally Louis Wirth, Urbanism as a Way of Life, 44 AM. J. OF SOC. 
(1938), https://www.jstor.org/stable/2768119. 
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neighborhood is typically free to do what they wish with their property 
so long as this does not involve commercial or industrial activity, does 
not include apartments or other multi-family dwellings, does not involve 
construction of buildings that are too high, too close to the property line, 
painted the wrong color, and so forth.249  In other words, the property 
owners are now often required to use their property in the same narrow 
sort of way as their neighbors do and may construct only roughly the 
same sort of buildings as their neighbors have.  Unlike nuisance law, 
which imposes a similar legal regime on all property owners in a 
jurisdiction,250 zoning law creates a maze of highly local prohibitions 
and permissions.  Clearly, something important has changed. 
Commentators hostile to zoning regulation sometimes present these 
changes in a sinister light.  Whereas before the introduction of zoning 
regulations, individual property owners were free to choose their own 
ends, today important decisions about uses of private lands are likely to 
be taken by public authorities.  Zoning skeptics such as Richard Epstein 
argue that this turns private land into a sort of common resources subject 
to dysfunctional collective management.251  The result, according to 
these skeptics, are overregulated suburbs that artificially inflate home 
prices for the benefit of incumbent owners and to the detriment of 
landowners who wish to develop their property and any would-be home 
buyers.252  On a more mundane level, homeowners with unusual plans 
or tastes are at the mercy of the goodwill of their neighbors, in a context 
where busybodies and those opposed to change are likely to play an 
outsized role. 
Whatever the force of this critique of zoning regulation as a general 
matter, existing use protection plays an important role in preserving the 
freedom of property owners to pursue projects of their choosing.  
Whereas the pre-zoning system of property law gave property owners 
broad discretion to choose what to do with their land, the present system 
allows property owners to select a property zoned appropriately for their 
intended use.  Once they own a property with the right zoning for their 
 
 249. E.g., POINT ARENA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 18.20.020 (2001), 
https://qcode.us/codes/pointarena/view.php?topic=18-18_20-18_20_020. 
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 252. See generally Edward L. Glaeser & Bryce A. Ward, The Causes and Consequences 
of Land Use Regulation: Evidence from Greater Boston, 65 J. URB. ECON. 265 (2009); see 
generally Edward L. Glaeser et al., Why Have Housing Prices Gone Up?, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 
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intended use and begin using it, they need not worry about subsequent 
zoning changes and thus may, if they choose, pay little attention to local 
zoning measures.253  Existing use protection thus assures property 
owners that their activities will not be disrupted by new zoning law so 
long as they are not especially noxious or burdensome.  In return for 
giving up some options with respect to their current property, they gain 
far greater certainty about the activities of their neighbors as well as 
additional protection against particularly burdensome activities.  Insofar 
as zoning rules are more or less efficient—a big if—higher property 
values should make most incumbent property owners better off even 
considering the inconveniences of being subject to voluminous zoning 
codes.254 
This new system of regulated private ownership relies on a 
combination of markets in land and private property rights to achieve a 
similar range of options for private property owners that was afforded 
by the pre-zoning system of private ownership.  If a property owner 
wishes to commence an activity prohibited by the applicable zoning 
rules (and she is not able to secure a variance or rezoning), she may 
purchase land that is zoned for this purpose and may sell her current 
landholdings to fund this purchase.  The trade-off here is that property 
owners face increased transaction costs (since commencing a new 
activity may require buying a new parcel) in exchange for great certainty 
about the activities of their neighbors.  Whether or not this trade-off is a 
good one, the new system does provide a similar range of options as well 
as legal protection for land use choices that do not greatly burden 
neighboring owners.  This is because property owners know that if they 
acquire a property zoned for their planned activity, their projects will not 
be disrupted by new zoning regulations.   
For property owners or would-be property owners, therefore, the 
present legal regime affords a similar range of options as the pre-zoning 
world, albeit with a different cost structure.  For most landowners, the 
burden of zoning regulation is not especially great.  Two groups of 
 
 253. This sort of simplicity is an underappreciated benefit of grandfathering. Even if 
homeowners and small business owners are likely to be able to defeat or be granted a variance 
from any zoning measures that would have truly catastrophic effects on their interests, having 
to pay attention to regulatory issues is itself a significant burden especially for those who are 
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police power regulations and therefore face regulatory risk even when protected from 
subsequent zoning changes. See, e.g., Elizabeth Joh, Opinion, Yes, States and Local 
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 254. William Fischel explains the spread and persistence of zoning largely in terms of 
bottom-up demand from homeowners. FISCHEL, supra note 61, at 215-18. 
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landowners, however, are significantly burdened by zoning laws in a 
way that is not mitigated by existing use protection.  First, property 
owners who wish to develop or redevelop land may find their options 
significantly constrained in ways that may greatly depress the value of 
undeveloped land.  Because developers do not usually obtain vested 
rights in a project until they are have made considerable outlays, they are 
particularly vulnerable to regulatory changes that might be made in 
response to their planned developments.  This is part of a pattern of anti-
development legal changes over the course of the twentieth century.255  
Whereas under the pre-zoning regime, property owners had a standing 
right to develop their property subject to nuisance law and generally 
applicable health and safety regulations, no such general right exists 
today.  Landowners today are protected from restrictions on 
development that are imposed through unfair or defective procedures or 
that deprive them of any valuable use for their land.256  Local 
governments, however, have a general authority to regulate development 
on private land restrictively so long as they follow the correct legal 
procedures and permit at least one valuable land use for any given parcel. 
This change is reflected not only in zoning law, but also in a host 
of other land use regulations that impede development or redevelopment, 
such as historical landmark designations,257 wetlands protection laws,258 
the Endangered Species Act,259 and a host of other environmental 
measures.  Whatever the wisdom of these laws, it is clear that the right 
to develop has been severely curtailed in ways that go well beyond 
zoning regulation.  As Joseph Sax observed in 1983, 
we are already so far along in diminishing developmental rights that 
owners are viewed, in important respects, as already on notice. 
Anyone today who holds, or wishes to buy, historical properties, 
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 258. California Coastal Act of 1976, CAL. PUB. RESOURCES CODE § 30255 (2020). 
 259. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (2020). 
 
2021] IN PRAISE OF NONCONFORMITY 795 
wetlands or coastal lands, or who plans developments in developing 
suburbs (to take but the most obvious examples), knows or should 
know that his opportunities for old-fashioned development are far 
from clear.260 
Since that time, the Supreme Court has taken a more active role in 
policing exactions,261 and there is also a recent trend toward suspicion of 
restrictive, anti-development, zoning policies.262  Nevertheless, the 
power of the state to prospectively limit intensive development has been 
largely untouched.   
Second, the neighbors of non-conforming properties are burdened 
by the ability of their neighbors to contravene the applicable zoning 
code.  Junkyards, liquor stores, dirty or noisy industries, high-rise 
apartments next to single family homes, busy retail businesses in quiet 
residential neighborhoods, and so on impose real burdens on their 
neighbors and are apt to lower property values.  This is a cost of existing 
use protection and one that doubtless has undesirable consequences in 
the relatively small number of cases involving burdensome activities of 
marginal economic value that cannot be limited by other means.  There 
are two reasons to think that this consideration should not be decisive.  
First, there are numerous other tools to deal with the most burdensome 
of nonconforming uses.  Nuisances may be terminated outright by 
zoning or by other regulations.  Generally applicable police power 
regulations can often be used to mitigate or prevent burdensome 
activities even when zoning regulation is unavailable.263  In some cases, 
neighbors will simply buy out a landowner conducting an unwanted 
activity.  Second, we should expect that neighbors of nonconforming 
properties object to them less than most prospective buyers.  In many 
cases, neighbors bought property with knowledge of the presence of the 
nonconforming use.264  Conversely, neighbors whose ownership pre-
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exists the non-conformity will be more likely to sell and move if they are 
bothered by it more than the average person. 
V. EXISTING USES AND INSURANCE 
The previous section sought to establish that existing use protection 
is valuable because it preserves the right of property owners to build 
structures and commence activities with full confidence that their plans 
will not be disrupted by future changes in zoning laws.  This protection, 
it was argued, is especially valuable because one of the functions of 
private ownership is to allow people to carry out projects over time.  It 
might be objected, however, that no plans are ever entirely secure and 
that for most people most of the time, the risks of zoning changes would 
be relatively small even without existing use protection.  Moreover, one 
might add, these risks might easily be outweighed by the potential 
benefits of zoning changes.  This defense of existing use protection, the 
objection would continue, is just a long-winded way of expressing 
skepticism about the utility of zoning regulation.  If future zoning 
regulation has a positive expected value, then it makes little sense to 
curtail its application simply because things might turn out poorly.  
Existing use protection, the argument concludes, is explained either by 
irrational focus on downside risk or by the political power of incumbent 
landowners with nonconforming uses who are able to insist on 
grandfathering their properties even when this is not in the public 
interest. 
The question of whether to grant special protection to existing uses 
is one species of a large class of “legal transitions” problems.265  When 
laws change, the government can mitigate the effect of these changes by 
providing “transition relief” for those adversely affected in the form of 
“grandfathering,” delayed enforcement, or compensation.266  Existing 
use protection is an example of the first, amortization an example of the 
second, and eminent domain an example of the third.  The legal 
transitions literature has been centrally focused on tax policy and 
eminent domain.267  Existing use protection has received less 
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attention.268  The wisdom of providing transition relief to those who 
relied on the old legal rule depends strongly on the relative value of 
deterrence and insurance.269  Deterrence refers not only to the 
enforcement of the new rule but also to the desirability of encouraging 
regulated parties to anticipate future regulations and make choices that 
are efficient in light of their best estimate of the probability of future 
regulations.270  One problem with transition relief is that it undermines 
the incentive to anticipate future regulations.  For example, if a factory 
owner is confident that her factory will not be subject to subsequent 
pollution regulations because of a “grandfather” clause in the regulation, 
she will have less incentive to invest in pollution control technology.  
Insurance refers to the mitigation of the risk of legal change.271  Like 
private insurance for natural disasters or for accidents, transition relief 
insures regulated parties against future regulation by reducing the costs 
of making choices today that run afoul of these regulations tomorrow.  
For example, the “takings” clause implicitly insures property owners 
against the risks of eminent domain by promising compensation if the 
government decides to exercise its eminent domain powers.272  A final 
consideration is that transition policies differ in the incentives that they 
provide for government policy-makers.  For example, compensation as 
a transition relief policy might deter the government from introducing 
socially inefficient regulation.  Exempting certain parties from 
regulation changes political dynamics and thus influences which 
regulations are actually enacted. 
The ex ante appeal of transition relief is that it mitigates risk.  In 
this sense, it functions like insurance.  A policy of grandfathering 
existing factories under environmental regulation reduces the regulatory 
risk associated with manufacturing.  Of course, this does not come for 
free.  Insofar as transition relief reduces risks for some parties, it 
undermines the efficacy of new regulation by, for example, allowing 
more pollution than would a regulation without a grandfather clause.  
And so, the efficiency costs of transition relief must be weighed against 
the risk mitigation value of insurance.  Not surprisingly, this analysis 
often suggests skepticism about transition relief because there are sharp 
limits to the extent to which the benefits of risk spreading may outweigh 
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the costs of regulatory inefficiencies.273  Legal theorists critical of the 
dominant trend have identified a number of factors that militate in favor 
of transition relief.  These include cases in which regulated parties are 
unlikely to anticipate future changes in regulatory policy,274 cases in 
which new regulations are not overwhelmingly likely to be an 
improvement over the status quo,275 cases in which parties complying 
with the old law would face high costs in changing their behavior to 
comply with the new law and the benefits of complying with the new 
rather than the old law are incremental.276  Zoning regulation has all of 
these features. 
The value of “insurance”—statutory protection for existing uses 
that assures property owners that their land use choices will be 
grandfathered under subsequent zoning regulations—is substantial.  As 
argued above, the value of being able to make land use choices that will 
be respected in the future is an important part of the connection between 
property and freedom.  The efficiency argument against grandfathering 
would be more compelling in the case of existing uses if all landowners 
were well-capitalized corporations with diverse business interests.  The 
interest of public corporations in forming and carrying out plans over 
time can be reduced to purely financial interests.  They are likely to be 
reasonably sophisticated in evaluating regulatory risk.  And most large 
corporations can usually afford to “self-insure” (i.e., pay the full cost if 
it comes to that) for the sort of losses at issue here.  This is one of the 
economies of scale enjoyed by large enterprises.  Large corporations 
could, therefore, find it preferable to forgo existing use protection in the 
name of greater regulatory efficiency.  The attitude of individual 
corporations is likely to depend overwhelmingly on their line of 
business.  Corporate interests likely to be targeted by zoning laws 
(industrial concerns, real estate developers) are both more likely to favor 
grandfathering and more likely to take a strong interest in land use 
policy. 
Land use regulations, however, are more likely to affect individual 
homeowners and small businesses as large corporations.277  For 
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individual homeowners and small businesses, land and buildings are 
likely to be a significant proportion of their net worth.  They are less well 
positioned to absorb significant losses from regulatory change and more 
likely to be deterred by even relatively small risks of rezoning.  They, 
therefore, may be deterred from purchasing or expanding homes or 
businesses even when a less risk-sensitive actor would not be.  And they 
are likely to care deeply when their plans for the homes and businesses 
are disrupted in a way that goes beyond their financial interests.278  
Public corporations do not care about personal autonomy as such, but 
natural persons, in both their private and professional lives, certainly do. 
Individuals and small businesses also vary greatly in their 
sophistication about regulatory matters.  Some homeowners and 
business owners pay a great deal of attention to local politics and may 
be positioned to assess regulatory risk.  But others do not.  Evolutionary 
dynamics will tend to eliminate large corporations that do not correctly 
evaluate regulatory risk.279  But this is not true for individuals.280  It is 
not appropriate, therefore, to assume a high degree of legal 
sophistication even for parties with an incentive to be concerned with 
future land use regulation.  This means that the benefits of giving 
property owners greater incentive to anticipate future zoning changes 
may be quite modest in most cases.  One virtue of existing use protection 
is that it lowers the stakes for most parties and makes it easier to run a 
small business without worrying much about zoning changes.  Requiring 
small businesses to do so will tend to favor large, legally sophisticated 
commercial organizations and disfavor most small businesses. 
Focusing regulatory changes on future, but not present uses, leaves 
developers highly vulnerable to changes in zoning law because zoning 
regulations may be changed in anticipation of unwanted developments.  
However, developers may, as a general matter, be well positioned to bear 
the risks of a somewhat unpredictable regulatory regime.  They are likely 
to be well-capitalized.  As specialists in, among other things, evaluating 
regulatory risk, they are relatively well-positioned to assess the 
likelihood that a development project will be foiled by imposition of land 
use regulations.  Abolishing blanket protection for existing uses would 
tend to make developers more cautious about “racing” to beat imminent 
zoning changes.  But insofar as this is the real problem, it could be 
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addressed by modifying vested rights doctrine without disrupting 
existing use protection in other contexts.  The benefits of cancelling 
existing use protection for those who purchase properties from 
developers may be rather modest.  Subsequent buyers may not be either 
well equipped to evaluate regulatory risk or able to self-insure.  Unless 
subsequent buyers are able to accurately gauge regulatory risk, 
abolishing existing use protection might slightly lower the prices at 
which developers are able to sell across the board rather than disfavor 
specifically those projects likely to conflict with future zoning 
regulations.  This would have the effect of discouraging development in 
general rather than discouraging development that is undesirable in light 
of future regulatory changes.   
Other considerations also weigh in favor of grandfathering existing 
uses and structures.  As Steven Shavell has argued, grandfathering is an 
attractive approach to legal transitions when choices made in reliance on 
the prior law reduce the efficiency gains under the new law.281  What 
might be an inferior legal rule in the abstract is less unattractive to the 
extent that people have ordered their affairs so as to comply with it and 
reordering their affairs to comply with the new law would be 
expensive.282  This is especially true when the efficiency gains from the 
new regulation are modest.  Reliance on property law is extensive.  
Homes are built or modified, businesses opened, investments made, and 
so on.  The web of reliance interests is complex and extends beyond 
owners and renters of property.283  For example, employees may choose 
to work at a particular business because of its convenient location or 
purchase a home because it is near their place of employment.  Even 
when zoning laws are excessively permissive, people can mitigate their 
effect in various ways.  The presence of a noisy or otherwise disruptive 
business may influence the design and layout of buildings on nearby lots.  
People who are less sensitive to the burdensome use may choose to 
purchase nearby properties in the same way that those who do not mind 
airplane noise might save money on housing by living near an airport.  
Structures and uses that would be proscribed by an ideally efficient 
zoning code may therefore do less harm than might appear at first blush. 
The flip side of this observation is that the gains from new zoning 
laws are often rather modest.  The case against grandfathering is 
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strongest in areas such as product liability and health and safety 
regulation in which it is desirable to encourage regulated parties to 
anticipate harms to their customers and employees and take preventative 
measures before regulators act.284  Zoning regulation, however, has a 
much more attenuated connection to health and safety.285  Insofar as a 
land use poses the sort of direct hazard to health that would make it 
analogous to product liability torts, it almost certainly constitutes a 
nuisance and thus may be regulated even under existing doctrine.  Local 
governments also have broad powers to regulate non-nuisances that pose 
threats to health or safety outside of the zoning code under their police 
powers health or safety.  In any case, the vast majority of zoning 
regulation is not meant to deter threats to life or limb.286   
A careful examination of the purposes of zoning regulation 
suggests that only some of the aims of zoning law would be served by 
the elimination of non-conformities.  One of the noteworthy features of 
American zoning law is its sheer scope.  As William Fischel remarked, 
“section 1 of the SZEA delegates to the municipality the power to control 
virtually every aspect of private development.”287  The objectives of 
zoning regulation are, not surprisingly, extremely varied.  A non-
exclusive list of the basic aims includes separation of conflicting land 
uses, restriction of demand for public services, aesthetic regulation, 
restriction of unwanted development, and environmental protection.288  
Serkin focuses on separation of conflicting land uses and on aesthetic 
regulation, which are areas in which the persistency of non-conformities 
does tend to undermine the purposes of zoning regulation.289  The effect 
of existing use protection in other areas is more ambiguous. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR TAKINGS LAW 
Even if one were to accept Serkin’s diagnosis that existing uses are 
treated with too much deference,290 his cure might be worse than the 
disease.  Serkin points out that protection of existing uses “put enormous 
pressure on such amorphous tests such as vested rights, the harm 
exception for takings liability, and the minimum duration of 
 
 284. Logue, supra note 265, at 229-30. 
 285. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 295 P. 14, 17 (Cal. 1930) 
 286. See id. at 17. 
 287. FISCHEL, supra note 61, at 138. 
 288. See, e.g., Zoning and Land Use Planning, WORLD BANK, https://urban-
regeneration.worldbank.org/node/39#:~:text=The%20purpose%20of%20zoning%20is,down
%20development%20in%20specific%20areas (last visited Apr. 2, 2021). 
 289. See generally Serkin, supra note 6. 
 290. Serkin, supra note 6, at 1228. 
 
802 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:61 
amortization provisions”291 and complains that “[t]hese tests do nothing 
to advance the clarity of land use doctrine and actually obstruct a more 
direct inquiry into the character and magnitude of a regulation’s effects 
on property rights.”292  Serkin concludes that existing uses should 
receive no special statutory or constitutional protection but instead 
should be subject to the same takings and due process analysis as other 
land use regulations.293  In many cases, this analysis would suggest that 
the existing use should be protected, but in others, it would not.294   
There is an internal tension in Serkin’s position here.  He objects to 
doctrines such as vested rights and minimum amortization periods on the 
grounds that they are unclear and do not track the interests actually at 
stake.295  But his proposed solution is to repeal the existing uses 
exception to zoning codes and thus expose more properties to land use 
regulations that will trigger constitutional challenges.  Encouraging 
courts to use takings and substantive due process analysis to scrutinize 
regulations that attack existing uses, in theory, might allow courts to 
grapple with the real normative considerations in each case.  But, in 
practice, there is little reason to believe this would result from takings 
analysis and almost none for substantive due process.  It is very doubtful 
that this change would bring greater order or predictability to land use 
jurisprudence.  Neither federal nor state courts have, to this point, shown 
much interest in grappling with the nuances of the policy issues raised 
by zoning cases. 
Without statutory protection for existing uses, courts must use 
constitutional protections for property rights to separate impermissible 
from impermissible regulations.  Assuming that the zoning authority 
follows the appropriate process to enact new regulation, there are two 
types of constitutional claims that might be used to attack regulations 
targeting existing uses: takings claims and substance due process claims.  
The results might be far from salubrious for either area of law. 
Regulatory takings are an intricate and, to almost everyone, 
unsettling body of law that is notorious for its unclarity.296  There are two 
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categories of per se regulatory takings: cases involving physical invasion 
of the affected property297 and cases involving deprivation of any 
economically valuable use of the property.298  Most cases in which a 
nonconforming use is terminated will not fall into either category of per 
se taking because the regulation does not involve any physical invasion 
of property and will typically leave some economically productive use 
of the land even if one of less value.  In such cases, a court must then 
turn to the Penn Central test, which directs it to consider (1) the 
“economic impact” of the regulation (2) the extent to which it “has 
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,” and (3) “the 
character of the government action.”299  The majority opinion in Penn 
Central suggests that the fact that a regulation terminates an existing use 
is relevant on at least the second and third prongs of the analysis.300  
Existing uses are typically associated with some degree of investment-
backed expectations.  And interference with existing uses rather than 
options for future use might be thought to be relevant to the character of 
government action, although the extent to which this is the case will 
depend on how plausible a court finds the considerations adduced above 
in favour of existing use protection convincing.  Even scholars who do 
not favour especially broad understandings of the takings clause suggest 
that imposition of transition costs on a small subset of similarly situated 
parties raise special concerns.301 
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In practice, however, it is unclear how the fate of non-conforming 
uses would play out if statutory protections were removed.  As a general 
matter, federal courts are hesitant to weigh in on local zoning issues, 
seeing this as primarily a state and local matter.302  Although state courts 
could develop more aggressive takings jurisprudence than mandated 
under federal law—some states even have “takings” clauses in their own 
constitutions—few appear eager to do so.303  Instead, state courts tend to 
be very deferential to local government when hearing takings claims.304  
State courts tend to be deferential to the government when applying the 
Penn Central test.305  In a statistical study of takings cases, James Krier 
and Stewart Sterk found that “state courts have come close to developing 
a categorical rule that regulatory actions do not constitute takings unless 
they are governed by one of the Court’s two per se takings rules.”306  
Nevertheless, attacks on existing uses are somewhat of an exception to 
this rule being the one area in which claimants have some hope of 
success under Penn Central.307  Although this trend emerges from an 
analysis of a large sample of takings cases, its doctrinal basis is less 
certain as state courts tend to be less than clear in their analysis when 
applying Penn Central.  Krier and Sterk note that “[w]e surely cannot 
say that state courts roundly ignore the rules, but we do have the 
impression that they wander off untethered to an unsettling degree.”308  
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This should not be surprising since state constitutional land use law is no 
closer to being a model of doctrinal order and perspicuity.  As Norman 
Williams Jr. and John M. Taylor have noted, “A literal-minded reading 
of the case law will show that, in perhaps nine out of ten cases involving 
constitutional questions, there is no indication as to which constitutional 
doctrine was involved.”309  If state court judges do not even make clear 
what doctrines their land use cases are decided under, asking to craft a 
nuanced response involving the careful application of the complex Penn 
Central test is asking much.   
The likely effect of removing statutory protection for existing uses 
would be to subject a large new groups of regulations to a legal standard 
so vague and confusing that leading commentators have remarked that 
“[i]t would dignify the approach too much to describe it as a multi-
factoral test or even a balancing test.”310  It is likely that given the 
sensitivities around terminating non-conforming uses and the 
sympathies of at least some number of judges for such claimants,311 the 
number of successful claims would not be entirely trivial.  Nevertheless, 
there is significant danger that such a solution would leave us with the 
worst of both worlds, providing enough litigation risk to deter local 
governments from making use of their new power to terminate non-
conforming uses when this might be appropriate, while failing to provide 
an adequate remedy for more than a small number of deserving 
claimants. 
In addition to the problems with the substance of regulatory takings 
claims, there are serious difficulties with the remedies available to the 
owners of non-conforming properties.  It is widely recognized that 
compensation in terms of fair market value undercompensates those 
whose property is taken by eminent domain.312  There are pragmatic 
reasons to limit compensation in takings cases to market value.  Courts 
are usually poorly positioned to assess super-market subjective 
valuations of owners, especially when plaintiffs have an incentive to 
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overstate their valuations.  And some of the damage done by a taking, 
such an interference with the autonomy of the property owner, may not 
be readily monetizable even under perfect information.  Furthermore, 
one might worry that high compensation will discourage worthwhile 
regulations and uses of eminent domain.  Given that the doctrine 
governing compensation for takings is unlikely to change, compelling 
more property owners to resort to takings claims in the face of new 
zoning regulations will only compound the under-compensation 
problem. 
Although residential property might be thought to typically involve 
more consumer surplus than commercial property, the under-
compensation problem is particularly acute for commercial property in 
other respects.  Business goodwill is not usually considered property for 
the purposes of takings analysis.313  Even when courts find that a 
regulation constitutes a regulatory taking, compensation is usually 
calculated in terms of lost property value, not foregone profits.314  In 
some cases, the two measures will be roughly equivalent.  But where an 
affected business has a great deal of goodwill, a regulatory taking that 
disrupts an existing enterprise might result in diminution of profits that 
are far greater than diminution of property value.  The failure of takings 
jurisprudence to protect goodwill, future profits and other such interests 
beyond the fair market value of property is one motivation for protection 
of existing uses.  Amortization policies exist in part to allow property 
owners to realize these sorts of value before they are subject to the new 
regulatory regime.  To the extent that property owners are not able to 
recover lost profits, even successful takings claims may not provide 
adequate compensation for their losses.  And this, in turn, only 
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(2005). 
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strengthens the bargaining power of local governments seeking to settle 
claims for substantially less than a court would award a successful 
claimant. 
Whereas removal of statutory protection for non-conforming uses 
would introduce a great deal of uncertainty about the scope takings 
claims that would result for local governments exercising their new 
authority, the situation with respect to substantive due process claims is 
more clear.  Land use regulations can be invalidated as a matter of 
substantive due process if they lack “any reasonable justification in the 
service of a legitimate governmental objective,” or are arbitrary.315  This 
inquiry tends to be deferential to regulatory authorities.316  Courts 
usually uphold a regulation if the government can advance some 
plausible rationale.317  This seems to follow from a broader tendency for 
judges to try to avoid resolving land use regulation disputes, which often 
might be thought to turn on factual nuances and the particulars of local 
context.318  Termination of a non-conforming use is unlikely to be 
arbitrary by virtue of its non-conformity since the feature that renders a 
property non-conforming is its violation of the applicable zoning 
regulation (particular state actions against non-conformities might, of 
course, turn out arbitrary for any number of reasons idiosyncratic to the 
case in question).  And the implementation of even rather onerous zoning 
regulations must surely be considered, for better or worse, a legitimate 
governmental objective nearly one hundred years after Euclid.319  It is 
unlikely, therefore, that removing categorical protection for existing uses 
will result in careful weighing of costs and benefits by a court as is 
Serkin’s hope.  Current practice suggests that courts hearing substantive 
due process claims from owners of non-conforming properties will find 
for the government unless the court views the government’s actions as 
manifestly irrational.  The choice, therefore, would not be between 
protection of existing uses and judicial weighing of costs and benefits, 
but between statutory protection of existing uses and judicial deference 
to regulations that appear minimally rational. 
 
 315. Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998). 
 316. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Litigating Land Use Cases in Federal Court: A Substantive 
Due Process Primer, 55 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 69, 109-21 (2020) [hereinafter 
Mandelker, Litigating Land Use]; FISCHEL, supra note 61, at 93 (“As applied to zoning, 
substantive due process has seldom provided relief for aggrieved property owners or 
developers, especially after the 1930s, when the Supreme Court adopted a highly deferential 
view of New Deal legislation.”). 
 317. See Mandelker, Litigating Land Use, supra note 316, at 115-19. 
 318. See, e.g., Cenergy-Glenmore Wind Farm #1, LLC, v. Town of Glenmore, 769 F.3d 
485, 487 (7th Cir. 2014); FISCHEL, supra note 61, at 127. 
 319. Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
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Serkin’s contention that repealing the exemption for existing uses 
will result in a more direct judicial inquiry into the character and 
magnitude of a regulation’s effect on property rights suffers from two 
fundamental problems.320  The first is that courts approach to substantive 
due process and, to a less extent, takings claims in the land use context 
is highly deferential to local government so long as the government 
avoids per se regulatory takings.  The second is that the applicable test 
for regulatory takings is so vague that if courts do not defer to local 
governments, a great deal of legal uncertainty would result.  Although it 
is theoretically possible that a new raft of land use takings cases would 
jolt the judiciary into crafting rules for termination of existing uses that 
provide both practical guidance to property owners and local 
governments and reach a reasonable result in terms of policy, the more 
likely outcome would be that takings jurisprudence would muddle on in 
much the same way it has in the over forty years since Penn Central.  
Even in the unlikely event that legal doctrine settled in just about the 
right place and greater flexibility for zoning authorities to terminate 
existing uses in some instances raised the average quality of regulatory 
policy, it is not clear that these benefits would outweigh the greater legal 
uncertainty and litigation expenses that would result in having the 
judicial conduct searching analysis of the policy merits of zoning laws 
targeting pre-existing uses.  The risks are not worth it.  Such a step would 
be exciting for property law experts, but ominous for landowners, taxing 
for judges and perplexing for local government attorneys and their 
clients. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Statutory protection for existing uses is sound public policy.  
Although it did not fit the vision of most of the original proponents of 
comprehensive zoning, it has become an accepted part of zoning practice 
for good reasons that flow from the nature of zoning law and the 
normative function of property rights.  Vigorous elimination of 
nonconformities that do not constitute nuisances is justified only on a 
model of zoning that elevates strict separation of uses over other 
objectives.  As zoning regulation has developed, however, it has become 
clear that its core function is to guide development rather than to resolve 
pre-existing land use conflicts.  When combined with existing use 
protection and other police power authority, zoning regulation allows 
local government to implement land use plans and eliminate the most 
noxious uses while allowing landowners to make investment and pursue 
 
 320. See generally Serkin, supra note 6. 
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long term plans in reliance on the existing zoning rules.  In a context in 
which land use regulations are arguably too onerous in many urban 
areas,321 protection of existing uses is a valuable check on fiscal zoning. 
Protection for existing uses reflects two underlying commitments.  
First, private property is valuable in part because it provides individuals 
with a sphere in which they can exercise exclusive control.322  Part of the 
value of this private sphere is the ability to carry out one’s plans and 
projects over time.  From this point of view, frustration of an ongoing 
project is a different sort of harm than elimination of a future option.  
Protection of existing uses allows property owners to begin new projects 
with confidence that these projects will not be disrupted by most new 
land use regulation.  Distinguishing between an owner’s interest in 
pursing ongoing projects and her interest in freedom to choose between 
various options provides a principled reason to prohibit certain future, 
but not existing, uses of land under some circumstances.  Because of this 
asymmetry, existing use protection may be justified even in cases where 
it does not maximize property values.  It is especially valuable for 
homeowners and small business owners who may not be sophisticated 
about regulatory risk and who are not likely to have the ability to “self-
insure” against future land use regulations.   
By contrast, a zoning regime in which existing uses were not 
respected would leave landowners uncertain about the future legal status 
of their activities even if they are careful to acquire land that presently 
has zoning designation that fits their plans.  Landowners would not only 
lose control over the types of use permitted on their land, they would not 
be able to rely on the zoning designation of any property acquired to 
pursue a particular activity.  This would leave almost any commercial or 
industrial project perpetually at the mercy of zoning authorities and 
substantially undermine the degree to which property ownership protects 
the freedom of choice of property owners. 
The second commitment is a hesitance to use zoning law to resolve 
land use conflicts between existing legal uses.  A land use conflict exists 
when two nearby landowners lawfully develop their property in a way 
such that at least one of the uses reduces the value of the other use.  There 
are various possible ways to resolve the conflict.  Private bargaining 
might resolve the conflict.  If one use is a nuisance or otherwise violates 
police power regulations, one of the landowners could sue the other.  Or 
the government could try to eliminate one of the uses as a public 
 
 321. See, e.g., Glaeser & Ward, supra note 252; Glaeser et al., supra note 252, at 329-33; 
see generally YGLESIAS, supra note 262. 
 322. See generally LOCKE, supra note 215; see generally KANT, supra note 217; see 
generally HEGEL, supra note 217; see generally FICHTE, supra note 217. 
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nuisance.  Finally, the local government could use land use regulation to 
prohibit one of the two uses.  The protection of existing users reflects a 
policy of refraining from using zoning law to resolve this sort of conflict 
and letting the chips fall where they may.  Resolution of pre-existing 
land use conflicts by regulation involves reallocation of rights and 
wealth between neighbors and disrupts the common law regime that 
regulates relations between neighbors.  Aggressive use of zoning law 
upsets this equilibrium between neighbors and unsettles the allocation of 
decisional authority that property rules are meant to fix.   
The compromise that emerged from the controversy over zoning 
laws in the early twentieth century was that zoning regulations would be 
permitted to significantly impinge on the unfettered discretion of 
property owners but that pre-existing activities or structures that did not 
constitute nuisances would generally be permitted to continue.  The 
argument of this Article is that although this was not the original 
intention of the early proponents of zoning, the political process ended 
up in the right place.  Existing use protection is often viewed as a grubby 
concession to current property owners necessary to soften political 
opposition.  This attitude is a mistake.  Existing use protection instead 
reflects the adaptation of traditional property rights in land to modern 
conditions. 
